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ABSTRACT 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Central Asian states faced several 
challenges concerning their political autonomy in a globalized economic system. 
Foreign policy formation was top priority for acquiring international recognition. 
Leadership in Tajikistan focused political efforts on recruiting Arab Muslims in 
Afghanistan as allies based on religious and cultural ties. Relations with the 
neighboring countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) currently depend on 
foreign policy for national interests particularly after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. Tajikistan implemented an “open door” policy that led the 
relatively new nation to gain international recognition and strengthen relationships 
with GCC countries. Tajikistan and GCC countries currently work in collaboration to 
develop a “pan-Islamic” pattern of international relations. However, in recognizing its 
unique form of independence, political leaders in Tajikistan engage in risky political 
behaviors that effectively damage national reputation. The results of this study 
indicate that while Tajikistan has the potential to play a critical role for economic 
development in Central Asia, its geography may require placing restrictions on 
imports for agricultural goods. Moreover, labor migration to GCC countries like the 
United Arab Emirates and Qatar suggest that future studies should evaluate the effects 
of FDI and remittance flows from host to home country in shaping foreign policy 
directions. The political and economic future of Tajikistan and GCC countries 
depends on the leveraging of consumer markets while striking an important balance 
in foreign policy developments. 
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Introduction 
 The modern history of Tajikistan gaining political autonomy after the Soviet 
Union's collapse in 1991 coincides with internal and external historical 
transformations. Since independence, the Central Asian nation continues to face 
severe economic and social problems resembling pre-independence conditions. As 
Tajikistan started to emerge as a new entry in global markets, a bloody civil war from 
1992 to 1997 damaged its reputation as a major economic player (Jonson, 2006). 
Post-Civil War political efforts in the Tajik government refer to the development of 
“open door” policies intent on working on multiple levels with countries of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC). Open door policies granted opportunities for Tajikistan 
to play an active role in combating international crimes, terrorism, and drug 
trafficking1. Moreover, open door policies addressed significant environmental and 
demographic challenges specific to Tajikistan. Because of their relationship with 
GCC countries, Tajikistan aimed to develop a “pan-Islamic” pattern to include 
practicing Muslims in neighboring Afghanistan.  
 Tajikistan occupies a unique geopolitical position in Central Asia based on the 
Turkic origin of many neighboring countries. When the Soviet Union held power in 
that region, native Tajiks worked primarily in Arab embassies and consulates 
established by the Foreign Services Ministry (Zarifi, 2009a, b). As early as 1974, 
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Soviet leadership sent a few Tajik intellectuals to Saudi Arabia as part of a plan to 
establish bilateral trade agreements (Melkumyan, 2005). Presently, similar 
agreements between Russia and Qatar have a demonstrative effect on how Tajikistan 
relates with GCC countries and Afghanistan (Global Intelligence Files, 2013). 
Interestingly, the Russian ambassador for Qatar is of Tajik origin (Radio Ozodi, 
2013). From the establishment of bilateral trade agreements between these nations, 
the Gulf States felt obliged to channel large amounts of financial support. This 
financial aid varied from being in-kind goods to the humanitarian and even for the 
revival of religious institutions2.  
 Of special importance in Tajik-GCC relations is how each nation constructs 
foreign policy directives according to geographical location, regional economy, and 
energy reserves. As noted in the literature review, a significant research gap on Tajik-
GCC relations suggests the lack of international recognition acquired by Tajikistan as 
having an influential role in global trade relations. Despite this gap, this study 
highlights bilateral trade relations between two sets of countries. From analyzing the 
relationships between (1) Kazakhstan and GCC countries and (2) between Uzbekistan 
and Saudi Arabia, economic and historical interactions provide some insights as to 
how Tajikistan and GCC countries can develop stronger economic trade agreements.  
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Significance of the Study 
 To date, this study is the first to address Tajik-GCC relations in the post-
Soviet era. The study has scientific and practical significance for outlining possible 
developments in foreign policy in Tajikistan and GCC countries. Because Tajikistan 
is a “small” state, foreign policy efforts require the establishment of a discussion 
platform that encourages geopolitical scholars to recognize the drivers and barriers 
for developing effective initiatives. Of practical significance is how policy drivers 
rely on decision-making process affecting how leadership in Tajikistan and GCC 
countries worked towards establishing mutually cooperative relationships for 
promoting national interests.  
 
Research Questions and Hypothesis 
 Since there has been no prior studies recognizing the effects of foreign policy 
on Tajik-GCC relations, the main research question is, What is the nature of the 
relationship between Tajikistan and GCC countries? In answering this research 
question, this thesis first will seek an answer to the following sub-questions:  
- How historical and cultural issues embodied the Tajik-GCC relation? 
- What are the driven factors in the Tajik foreign policy that determine this 
relationship? 
- How did the relationship develop and what are the obstacles? 
With that said, the study analyzes the historical and cultural issues embedded in 
Tajik-GCC relations to consider which foreign policy efforts will have the most 
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positive effects particularly for Tajikistan. This study also assesses the advantages of 
open door policies between Tajikistan and GCC counties. From the research question, 
the research hypothesis assumes that, from a Tajik perspective, foreign policy efforts 
in Tajikistan have historical and cultural patterns of political behavior as underscored 
by early post-Soviet era political ideology. 
 
Research Methodology 
 This study uses an exploratory research design. Exploratory studies have their 
place in academic research when gaps in the scholarly literature provide glaring 
evidence of an imperative to conduct future studies. As a primarily qualitative 
research method, exploratory studies aim to serve three core purposes of fulfilling 
intellectual curiosity, testing the feasibility of previously supported hypotheses, and 
suggesting methodological approaches to use in future studies (Stebbins, 2001). 
Drawing from Jonson (1998), exploratory research involved developing a case study 
from in-depth interviews with participants of Tajik origin to test the previous 
hypothesis that foreign policy behaviors when establishing bilateral agreements with 
Western countries affect similar behaviors with GCC countries. To develop a case 
analysis, this study drew from primary and secondary sources. Primary sources 
included interviews with government representatives with current or former 
involvement in Tajik-GCC relations, academics, private business representatives, as 
well as news content analysis. Secondary sources referred to published academic 
studies from scholars, governmental archives, documents, and correspondence. 
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Published academic studies had authorship mostly by scholars in Russia, Central 
Asia, and GCC countries.  
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 This thesis consists of four chapters. Chapter One reviews the published 
scholarly literature on the historical developments of foreign policy in Tajikistan. 
Based on its national history, foreign policy efforts in Tajikistan suggest beginning 
steps of bridging a geopolitical gap between itself and GCC countries. However, 
some contradictions between various political efforts point to how Tajikistan remains 
in its early stages of independent statehood. Chapter Two provides a theoretical 
framework for analyzing foreign policy behaviors in Tajikistan. By applying the 
theory of “small state behavior,” this chapter argues that the main reason for 
divergence in foreign policy efforts between Tajikistan and neighboring states is 
because of its status as a relatively new entrant in global markets. Chapter Three 
highlights Tajik-GCC relations in the post-Soviet era by discussing the advantages 
and barriers to implementing effective bilateral trade agreements. The final chapter 
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Chapter One: Historical Overview and Review of the 
Literature 
 This chapter provides a critical assessment of the available literature on Tajik-
GCC relations. The national history of Tajikistan, a history of Tajik foreign policy, 
and a history of Tajik-GCC relations indicate three research strains important for this 
study. As noted, a significant research gap on foreign policy behavior in Tajik-GCC 
relations suggests an imperative for scholars to conduct future studies. Most of the 
research literature focuses on countries in Central Asia while only a small portion 
draw special attention to Tajikistan. Unfortunately, the research literature on 
Tajikistan describes the nation as having a war-torn history. Moreover, the historical 
research on Tajikistan serves to promote distinctly Western political and economic 
interests. Despite the lack of widely available scholarly research, this review of the 
literature highlights the development of Tajik-GCC relations as linked with the 
success of surrounding countries in Central Asia. The success of their relationships 
with GCC countries thus provides a model from which Tajik political leaders may 
draw inspiration when constructing foreign policy.  
 
Historical Overview 
 Tajik nation-building shares a common history with imperialist philosophies 
of previous empires in Central Asia (Fuller, 1998). For example, the Sasanid Empire, 
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ruled Iran before Arabs engaged in a takeover (Rahmonov, 2001). Native Tajiks 
comprise a national group of Iranian descendants in a Turkic-speaking environment 
of Central Asia traceable to the first century BCE (Shozimov, 2004). Prior to 
receiving the name Tajikistan, the geographical region of Transoxania and 
Mawarannahr also had a uniquely Greek influence.  
 Because Tajikistan developed its cultural identity from Arab and Greek 
influences, this area of Central Asia was an international trade hub bridging the gap 
between Eastern and Western hemispheres. Despite lasting almost 400 years, the 
Sasanid Empire collapsed under Arab forces takeover by commanding Islamic 
religious authority. Native Persians living in this Central Asian region aided in the 
interaction of Arabs with native Tajiks, though neighboring Turkic tribes also brought 
on the Sasanid collapse (Barthold, 1977). However, after the mid-nineteenth century, 
Tajik cultural identity first drew influence from Russia.  
 
Arab Conquest 
 After the collapse of the Sasanid Empire, Arabs of the seventh and eighth 
centuries CE aimed to develop a nation founded on Islamic principles. Iranians who 
migrated to Central Asia, now known as Mawarannahr (Gafurov, 1949), destroyed 
the pre-Islamic literature and culture to foster national interests. International trade 
occurred between military stations along caravan roads. At the same time, Arabs 
implemented their language and alphabet in religious, scientific, and government 
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documents. However, during the 1930s and 1940s, Arabic script changed before 
changing once more to the Cyrillic characters of the written Russian language. Very 
broadly, the history of Arab conquest suggests that the Tajik language draws half of 
its influence from spoken and written versions of Arabia.  
 
The Samanids 
 After the Sasanid Empire collapsed, the subjugation of Mawarannahr to 
Muslim rule led to dangerous internal and external political conflict. Most of the 
political conflict stemmed from socioeconomic differences between Tajik aristocrats 
well-accustomed to local conditions and the remaining population (Barthold, 1977). 
Arab expansion into Central Asia resulted in continued struggles over how to 
eliminate political turmoil. Eventually, Persians took control over this part of Central 
Asia for the sake of gaining wide cultural, scientific, and religious followers 
(Bosworth, 1996). Relations with Middle East countries prior to the formation of 
GCC states and North African countries—Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco—
helped shape such a major influence3.  
 The Samanid Empire lasted for nearly 120 years. As a result, Persians held a 
special influence over the use of Islam to form a unique geopolitical cultural identity 
in this Central Asian region. Of scholarly interest, the Samanid Empire produced a 
wide range of renowned scholars while the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara received 
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recognition as religious centers rivaling the status obtained by cities like Baghdad 
(Tor, 2009). However, at the close of the tenth century CE, this region became more 
vulnerable to Turks approaching from the North. As noted in the next section, the 
Turkic invasion suggested a historical starting point of Tajik separation from the 
wider Muslim world. 
 
Turkic Invasion 
 In 999 CE, the Persian state of what is now currently known as Tajikistan fell 
to the Qarakhanid Turks who followed the historical patterns of conquerors. For five 
centuries, different groups of Turkic origin—Seljuk, Mongols, and Uzbeks—attacked 
settled, and intermarried with native Tajiks. In effect, the Turkic invasion introduced 
new linguistic, cultural, and demographic changes in the region. Interestingly, the 
Turkic invasion did not suppress Persian language and culture. However, interactions 
between Turks and Persians remained extremely limited.  
 During the sixteenth century CE, economic and cultural development in this 
part of Central Asia decreased sharply (Soucek, 2000). Europeans introduced 
maritime routes bypassing landlocked Central Asian countries while sectarian issues 
between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims isolated Central Asia from Turkey and the Middle 
East. Iran, in particular, blocked direct communications between merchants, pilgrims, 
and scholars (Soucek, 2000). Following into the Russian invasion of the nineteenth 
century, expansions of imperialist philosophy took hold over Central Asia. 
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Russian Domination 
 As Russian troops overtook control of the Emirate of Bukhara, the 
geopolitical agenda at hand involved placing native Tajiks in such a position that they 
could not do anything but sign disadvantageous trade agreements (Schuyler, 2001). 
Religious clergy in the city of Bukhara then declared a jihad against Russia over 
which they had no legitimate political power. Russia demanded that Muslim leaders 
recognize the necessity of territorial conquests, the importance of opening doors for 
economic trade, and compensate military troops. Unfortunately, religious leaders in 
Bukhara could not afford to pay the Russian government, which resulted in formation 
of geopolitical boundaries between Russia and Central Asia. 
 In 1920, three years after the Bolshevik Revolution, Russian soldiers in 
Central Asia formed the new, albeit short-lived, People's Soviet Republic of Bukhara 
(PSRB; Khotamov, 1997). From the formation of PSRB, the Central Asian region 
consisted of multiple republics formed on the basis of national identity formation. 
Tajikistan was thus able to declare its own national identity as the Soviet Union 
engaged in a rapid modernization process to provide long-term economic incentives. 
Russia invested in controlling the Tajik water supply by constructing hydro-energy 
stations. At the same time, Russia had to fight against religious backlash, even though 
Soviet Russia worked towards limited interactions with Central Asian Muslims, 
including native Tajiks, Afghanis, and Iranians (Khotamov, 1997). From this point 
onward, international relations in Central Asia remained under strict control from 
Russia.  
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 When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, dire economic consequences 
followed for Tajikistan and many neighboring Central Asian countries. Such 
economic consequences fomented a post-Soviet civil conflict in this region that lasted 
until 1997. The conflict resulted in the former Soviet Union placing draconian 
economic sanctions on Tajikistan such that the nation was incredibly poor during its 
first few years of political independence. Foreign policy negotiations between 
Tajikistan and Russia demonstrated that the newly independent nation remained 
dependent on its former protector. Because of its geographical position along ancient 
trade routes between China and Western countries, and as Tajikistan has a largely 
Muslim religious influence, national and cultural identity formation suggests pro-
Russian and pan-Islamic orientations4. Whereas a pro-Russian pattern entails 
independence as useful for developing effective foreign policy decisions, a pro-Islam 
pattern implies significant difficulties for what lies in the future. Regarding Tajik-
GCC relations, an explanation of foreign policy behaviors exclusively in Tajikistan 
provides some insights into how scholars and politicians may reconcile ideological 
differences.  
 
Literature on Tajikistan 
 Describing the history of Tajikistan as turbulent and incomplete is an 
understatement. Almost all nations in Central Asia have a history marked by the 
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“crudeness of their geography” that makes for extremely difficult living conditions 
(Comas et al., 1998, p. 1825). According to this logic, nations in Central Asia remains 
overlooked and understudied. As defined by Soviet scholars, nations of Central Asia 
include Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, part of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan 
are, important for this study. However, many Western scholars include Mongolia, 
Tibet, and China's Xinjiang Province as belonging to Central Asia (Comas et al., 
1998). While having few genetic similarities to populations in Eastern Asia, scientific 
research argues for genetic diversity between population groups of Central Asia as 
corresponding to the limits on geographic mobility (Comas et al., 1998). At the same 
time, Central Asian populations share only 17 genetic sequences with European 
populations.  
 Regardless of the issues surrounding genetic similarities and difference of 
Central Asian populations, Tajikistan is a landlocked country in this region that 
borders China to its east, Kyrgyzstan to the north, Uzbekistan to the northwest, and 
Afghanistan to the south (Boonstra&Shapovalova, 2012; Nourzhanov&Bleuer, 2013). 
Because of its location in largely mountainous terrain, Tajikistan has no strong 
connections with surrounding nations. The border between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
largely remains closed because of tense relations since the early 1990s 
(Boonstra&Shapovalova, 2012). Relations with Afghanistan imply major concerns by 
the European Union (EU) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) about 
national security as cause of clandestine networks of drug cartels along the border 
with Tajikistan.  
  13 
 The national history of Tajikistan follows a path of adapting to modern 
civilization brought on by military conquest. Since Alexander the Great, Tajikistan 
was under military rule until the Soviet Revolution in 1917 (Nourzhanov&Bleuer, 
2013). Under Soviet communism, Tajikistan adapted to an institution controlled by 
the instrumentalist goals associated with efficiency in regulating competition for 
economic and material resources amongst political elites. Soviet rule of Tajikistan 
prevented legitimation crises by providing stability through consensus from elites 
(Nourzhanov&Bleuer, 2013). Tajikistan underwent a period of state consolidation 
from  1930s to  1980s in which state structures could not legally influence local 
culture. Despite efforts to shift traditional patterns of social organization, religious 
beliefs, and political loyalties, Tajikistan sustained a centralized system of local 
networks that allowed regional actors to influence how well political arrangement 
succeeded. However, the violent Civil War from late spring 1992 until June 1997 led 
Tajikistan to view its national political and social history in terms of “before and 
after” when mentioning key trends and events (Nourzhanov&Bleuer, 2013, p. 8). 
Because of this change in understanding its national history, Tajikistan lacks a full 
comprehensive historical background about the social structure.  
 Some of the scholarly literature reports the “myth” of a “historical Tajikistan” 
referring to regions in contemporary Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan (Horák, 
2010, p. 66). According to some Tajik scholars, the national “history” of Tajikistan 
runs a course of nearly 2,500 years as established by the Achaemenids, or the First 
Persian Empire (Horák, 2010). Since then, Tajikistan's national history underwent 
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numerous revisions and reconstructions according to migration patterns and 
geographical location. Yet, regarding the development of a national identity, 
historians note how Tajiks idealize special qualities of their own people as “peaceful” 
and having “subjected no one to violence and cruelty” (Horák, 2010, p. 68). In 
observing the history of conflict between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, scholars of 
Central Asian history noted how, during the nineteenth century identity development 
involved Tajiks forcing Uzbeks to adopt the former's lifestyle and culture.  
 According to this history, anyone living in Central Asia identified as “Tajik” 
(Horák, 2010, p. 68). However, this history does not acknowledge the presence of 
clans from Turkey and Iran. Instead, “historical Tajikistan” places Tajiks as the heirs 
of Aryan civilization in Central Asia. In other words, Tajik identity has a history of 
identifying with an Aryan case in contrast to Uzbeks who were demonized as “Turks” 
(Horák, 2010, p. 69). During the middle ages, the development of a Samanid state 
represented an outstanding achievement that contributed to contemporary 
understandings of “historical Tajikistan” and the formation of a Tajik national 
identity. Despite continuing from the Sassanid era, the Samanid state represented a 
high point of Islamic civilization by Tajik historians (Horák, 2010; Hoseini, 2012). 
The Samanid state functioned as a simply organized and effective model of 
governance. Destruction of the Samanid state by Uzbeks referred to as “Turko-
Mongols” further suggests how “historical Tajikistan” encourage the development of 
a Tajik national identity as one contained within beliefs of social and cultural 
superiority. However, Tajik historians tend to overemphasize the Samanid state as 
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representing a critical point in the national history of Tajikistan (Horák, 2010). 
Rather, the Samanid state represents how, during the middle ages, a belief in rational 
social and political processes influenced Enlightenment thought in Europe. 
 Historical texts during the Sassanian era, lasting from the second to the 
seventh centuries CE, provide evidence for how Tajik national identity derived from 
the religious doctrines of “good versus evil” found in Zoroastrianism (Bekhandria, 
1994, p. 110). The influence of Iranian culture on Tajikistan led to negative opinions 
regarding Uzbeks. Iranian culture also influenced how, during the 1920s, Soviet 
leader Joseph Stalin allowed Uzbeks to lay ethnic claims over the towns Bokhara and 
Samarqand despite how both locations had a native Tajik population of 
approximately 90 percent (Bekhandria, 1994). Now symbols of classic Persia, 
Bukhara and Samarqand remain influenced by the Iranian-speaking elements of 
Samanid-era politics and culture as only half the population of those cities has Tajik 
origins (Hoseini, 2012). Because of how Stalin allowed Uzbeks to lay claim over 
Bokhara and Samarqand, Tajiks of Bukhara and Samarqand have few opportunities to 
develop a unique national identity while remaining autonomous (Behkhandria, 1994). 
After the Soviet Union granted independence to formerly Communist states, citizens 
of Tajikistan remained prohibited to access newspapers, books, or education in their 
own language.  
 As Tajikistan endured its civil war from 1992 to 1997, the newly independent 
nation had a status as the poorest former Soviet republic that also lacked an authentic 
history (Joharifard, 2010). Between 50,000 and 100,000 civilians lost their life during 
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the five-year-long civil war while another one million Tajiks experience displacement 
along internal and external fronts. Almost 70,000 Tajiks fled to Afghanistan while at 
least 100,000 went to the newly formed Commonwealth of Independent States and 
the Russian Federation (Joharifard, 2010). Schools in Tajikistan experienced severe 
declines in resources as the civil war destroyed nearly twenty percent of all existing 
schools. Overall health status of Tajikistan also declined severely as the result of 
diminished access to hospitals and clinics (Joharifard, 2010). Communicable diseases 
like tuberculosis rose sharply as Tajiks reported severe deficiencies in essential 
micronutrients.  
 Post-Civil War Tajikistan continues to demonstrate limited economic 
potential. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York City, 
relations between Tajikistan and Afghanistan incite further concern about the 
negative impact of efforts by NATO to withdraw soldiers from this area 
(Boonstra&Shapovalova, 2012). Political leaders in Tajikistan, including President 
Rahmon, stress that turbulent relations with Afghanistan and radical Islam remain 
significant threats not only to national security but also to the development of a 
singular national identity (Boonstra&Shapovalova, 2012). However, skeptics argue 
that relations between Tajikistan and Afghanistan remain turbulent because of 
internal conflicts among Tajik political leaders. Meanwhile, the United States view 
Tajikistan as a mere extension of Afghanistan in providing “peace and security” to 
the nation (Boonstra&Shapovalova, 2012, p. 6). In contrast, the EU prefers to view 
Tajikistan through the lens of protecting Central Asian nations against severe threats 
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to security. In that context, political discourse about security is directly related to the 
economic development in Tajikistan and in Central Asia.  
 Heathershaw (2009) questioned the widespread belief of economic liberalists 
that peacebuilding efforts in post-Soviet Tajikistan were not possible without the 
political mechanisms in place to establish independent statehood through democratic 
processes. According to post-positive theory, Tajikistan transformed its history from 
having the status as war-torn remnant of Cold War-era Soviet politics to one with an 
organically developed social order rooted in the philosophy of liberal democracy 
(Heathershaw, 2009). Political organizing at the local level aided the peacebuilding 
process in Tajikistan in three ways. First, Tajikistan found representation through 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international governments. Tajikistan 
also conducted peacebuilding activities with international political elites to bring 
about stability. Finally, Tajikistan engaged in peacebuilding activities to spread a 
belief in harmony and unity.  
 Rather than engage in liberal peacebuilding efforts, Tajikistan worked towards 
implementing formal democratic reforms after its post-Soviet civil war caused by a 
“complex crisis of decolonization” (Heathershaw, 2009, p. 25). After the Tajik’s civil 
war, political leaders developed a simulation of democratic processes to create a 
facade of legitimacy for the international community. Tajikistan acquired geopolitical 
legitimacy through its relations with neighboring Afghanistan. However, concerning 
Tajik-Afghan relations, peace-building efforts relied on what Heathershaw (2009, p. 
173) defined as an “inter-subjective process of complex legitimacy.” In other words, 
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Tajik-Afghan relations relied on differences in nation-building practices 
(Ubaidulloev, 2014). Most conflicts resulting from philosophical and political 
differences pertain to the amount of economic and material resources available for 
supplying global market chains. As Tajikistan continues to struggle with gaining 
international political and economic legitimacy, leadership in the former Soviet 
nation had come to terms with its past.  
 More recent studies on the history of Tajik nation-building highlight otherwise 
unknown links with gender studies, Islamic studies, social anthropology, and 
international relations (Heathershaw&Hirzig, 2013). The central argument in this 
research area is that nation-building efforts in Tajikistan rely on a unique socio-
historical context that shapes emergence and transformation. Four distinct 
contributions to Tajik nation-building shed light on how the Central Asian country 
strove to gain international legitimacy after the post-Soviet conflict.  
 Soviet imperialism during the 1920s and 1930s aided nation-building 
processes in Tajikistan despite its dependence on a communist authority 
(Heathershaw&Hirzig, 2013). Tajik identity formation within the context of Soviet 
politics reflected local connections, ethnic kinship affiliations, and religious 
upbringing in Islam. Tajik Muslims contributed to a political discourse of nation-
building that reflect the works of published academic research (Heathershaw&Hirzig, 
2013; Khalmukhamedov, 1998; Mesbahi, 1997).  Other contributing factors to Tajik 
nation-building drew from political philosophies of international and national 
security, crime and narcotics and state functioning (Heathershaw&Hirzig, 2013). 
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Ultimately, the modern Tajik state developed from processes similar to those for 
Uzbekistan.  
 International relations between Uzbekistan and Iran placed significant 
pressure on Tajik cultural life such that Tajik-Iranian relations deteriorated after pro-
Communist factions took over the Tajik government in December 1992 (Mesbahi, 
1997). While this historical event had a negative economic impact on major industries 
in Tajikistan, international relations with neighboring countries suggest a refusal of 
adhering to Soviet stereotypes. However, as the literature on Tajik foreign policy 
suggests, very little information can provide clues for how the Central Asian nation 
can establish strong geopolitical relationships with GCC countries. 
 
Literature on Tajik Foreign Policy 
Very few published scholarly sources on Tajik foreign policy appear in the 
English language, thus indicating a severely limited availability. Most of these 
publications appear in Tajik or Russian, though English interpretations of which are 
based on a personal acquisition of the researcher's language skills that provide some 
clues as to how Tajik foreign policy affects international relations with GCC 
countries. While working as a political officer for the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Jonson (2004) was one of the first to describe the 
regional impact of foreign policy in Tajikistan during her long-term visit there. Post-
Soviet Tajikistan struggled to find a balance of power after independence reviewed 
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published academic studies and online news articles. The vast majority of the sources 
reviewed by Jonson (2004) were by Tajik, Russian and Western scholars, politicians, 
and journalists. Most of the articles emphasized the importance of developing 
effective foreign policy infrastructure after the terrorist attacks of September 11 
(9/11), 2001.  
 Jonson (2004) asked three specific research questions intent on finding 
answers to explain shifts in Tajik foreign policy after the 9/11 attacks, why those 
shifts were necessary, and what the global implications were for those shifts. 
Accordingly, because the United States has a strong commitment levels in combating 
global terrorism, shifts in foreign policy affected Tajik-Afghan relations (Jonson, 
2004; Ubaidulloev, 2014). Foreign policy shifts in Tajikistan affected global trade 
routes for illegal drugs and weapons (Boonstra&Shapovalova, 2012). Similar shifts 
affected the water supply for Afghanistan as most of it came from the Tajik 
mountains (Jonson, 2004). Political power in both countries wanted to control the 
water supply so much that it affected international relations between Tajikistan and 
Russia as well as between Tajikistan and the United States. More interesting is how 
the position of Tajikistan in trade relations with China indicated high rates of turnover 
from between 2000 to 2007 (Ibraimov, 2009), partly because of its immigration 
policies encouraging foreign expatriates to work in the country (Wenruo, 2001). 
Though China had a very modest position regarding foreign trade with Central Asian 
nations, trade turnover grew rapidly from between 2000 and 2007 nearly fifteen-fold.  
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 By the close of 2007, China's share of trade with Central Asian nations 
reached almost 14 percent while foreign trade in this region constituted 0.7 percent of 
the Chinese economy (Ibraimov, 2009). During 2007, foreign trade between China 
and Uzbekistan amounted to almost 1.61 billion US dollars while trade between 
China and Kazakhstan totaled nearly 1.24 billion US dollars. Foreign trade between 
China and Kyrgyzstan amounted to 984 million US dollars in 2007 while trade 
between China and Turkmenistan totaled 377 million US dollars (Ibraimov, 2009). 
Lastly, foreign trade between China and Tajikistan in 2007 reached 684 million US 
dollars.  
 The largest markets of all Central Asia export Chinese goods to Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan, though joint markets may function in networks between Tajikistan and 
China (Ibraimov, 2009). For Tajikistan, China is the main stakeholder in domestic 
transport and communications based on investments in construction of power lines to 
provide electricity, equipment for building roads and railways, and human resources 
for advancing political and economic objectives (Dwivedi, 2006). According to 
Ibraimov (2009), China intended to redirect transportation and communication flows 
of the Karakorum highway, a major thoroughfare in Tajikistan, in a north-south 
direction as part of a political and economic strategy based on geographical location. 
Also, China reconstructed part of another major thoroughfare—the Dushanbe-
Khujand-Chanak Highway—that connected the Dushanbe metropolitan area with the 
north as it allowed for year-round traffic (Dwivedi, 2006; Ibraimov, 2009). In its 
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efforts to construct high-voltage transmission lines, China has Tajikistan at its 
economic behest based on hydro-electric capabilities. 
 Important in this discussion on economic trade is how Tajikistan stands as one 
of four Central Asian countries belonging to the Shanghai Cooperation Council 
(SCO; Cooley, 2015; Dwivedi, 2006). Other countries with SCO membership include 
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Because of its membership 
in SCO, Tajikistan must embody the foundational “Shanghai spirit” by revering 
official statements made by the Chinese government while also dedicate respect for 
principles of state sovereignty and noninterference in encouraging the 
“democratization of international relations” (Cooley, 2015, p. 52). Furthermore, 
membership in the SCO requires Tajikistan must not allow global governance 
institutions to impose political and economic restrictions on trade.  
 Russia's membership in the SCO influences how Tajikistan engages in foreign 
policy based on political and economic interests in trade through defending so-called 
“traditional values” (Cooley, 2015, p. 52). Tajik-Russian relations suggest that 
adhering to an anti-Western stance prevents political and economic decline as they 
claim to uphold moral authority. Western economic policies work against the ideals 
of SCO countries, as the argument goes, because of how they encourage a national 
culture defined by decadence (Cooley, 2015). Instead, Tajikistan relies on global 
political and economic networks adhering to nationalistic belief of securing a unique 
identity for developing a unique cultural heritage with deep religious and spiritual 
roots.  
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 In 2001, Russia played an active role in Tajik foreign policy development. 
Though Russia certainly held a great deal of authority in its relations with Tajikistan, 
the initial stages of foreign policy development emphasized struggles over who would 
control the most natural resources (Jonson, 2004). From 2002 to 2004, the Kremlin in 
Moscow provided Tajikistan with greater autonomy in constructing foreign policy 
initiatives. Finally, in October of 2004, a cooperation pact effectively re-established 
Tajik-Russian relations (Jonson, 2004). Despite how the two countries had their own 
conceptions of independent statehood and nation-building, Tajik-Russian relations 
represented significant power differences from political authorities (Jonson, 2004). 
Russia worked to consolidate its political power while Tajikistan continued to 
develop a philosophy of state autonomy contributing to shifts in foreign policy 
development.  
 After 9/11, Tajik-Russian relations involved three different shifts; before, 
during, and after the post-Soviet conflict in Tajikistan. Nearly six years prior to the 
Tajik civil war, relations between China and the former Soviet Union shaped relations 
between Tajikistan as much as it shaped relations with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
(Dwivedi, 2006). Tajik-Russian relations depended on strategic thinking by the 
Chinese government in securing two goals useful for securing foreign policy 
initiatives in Central Asia. These goals emphasized the need to maintain a stable 
geopolitical climate in securing economic welfare for Tajikistan as they promoted 
peaceful negotiations (Dwivedi, 2006). During the Tajik civil war, peaceful 
negotiations depended on relations between Russia and Iran along with coordinated 
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efforts by the United Nations (UN; Herzig, 2004). Concerning the importance of how 
Tajikistan established relations with GCC countries—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Oman—relations between Russia and 
Iran inspired the development of infrastructure projects that promoted increased 
levels of economic trade.  
 With respect to energy development projects involving hydroelectric power, 
relations between Russia and the United States cement initiatives for developing a 
“New Silk Road” by expanding trade from north to south by linking Pakistan and 
Afghanistan to Central Asian nations including Tajikistan (Kanat, 2012, p. 170). 
Concurrent with relations between Russian and the United States, foreign policy 
relations between the United States and Turkey played a key role in reforms to 
political and economic trade relations in Central Asia.  
 Unfortunately, the only scholarly information on how US-Turkey relations 
may have influenced Tajik-GCC relations points to how Turkey established “visa-free 
travel regimes” with Tajikistan (Babacan, 2011, p. 142). Three GCC countries—
Kuwait, UAE, and Qatar—have visa-free travel regimes with Turkey while Tajikistan 
signed two separate agreements for these regimes in 2003 and 2009 (Babacan, 2011). 
The fundamental purpose of having visa-free travel regimes in place was to promote 
free trade and encourage movement of people. As noted later in the thesis, visa-free 
travel regimes encouraged open-door policy formation in Tajik-GCC relations. On a 
more interesting note, because of their anti-Western stance, open-door policy 
formation relied on the establishment of complex national and regional identities. 
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 Zarifi (2009a, b) reviewed Tajik foreign policy in the early 2000s to describe 
the goals and outcomes of “open door” initiatives. Important milestones for Tajik 
foreign policy development involved lateral and bilateral agreements made between 
other Central Asian countries and international organizations. Open door policy 
frameworks in China influence both Tajik-Russian and Tajik-Afghani relations 
(Kalis, 2014; Wenruo, 2001). Unlike the descriptive approach of foreign policy 
development in Tajikistan (Jonson, 2004), open door policy approaches warrant more 
critical scrutiny. However, no research to date analyzes the effects of open door 
foreign policy developments on GCC states. Such scrutiny warrants a review of 
diplomatic, political, and socioeconomic factors as understood by some of the limited 
available research (Anceschi, 2014; Ehteshami, 1994; Karla&Saxena, 2009). Drawing 
from the history of Tajikistan as a nation, nation-building processes share a 
surprisingly common history with neighboring countries in Central Asia. 
 Secondly, very little scholarly information is available to describe the effects 
of these shifts in recent years. No information to date regarding Tajik-GCC relations 
focuses on shifts in foreign policy development. Concerning Tajik-Russian relations, 
the belief in maintaining national interests to hold political power over neighboring 
countries indicates that some international players, such as the United States, would 
rather not have Russia obtain a type of regional hegemony. Yet, because of its 
geopolitical location, Tajikistan has the potential to emerge as a key global 
competitor if foreign policy directives consider its economic future in relation to GCC 
countries.  
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 Implications for future research in this thesis indicates a large gap of 
published scholarly information on international relations between Tajikistan and 
Central Asian countries. Saidov (2003, 2011) highlighted aspects of relations between 
Tajikistan and Muslims countries such as Iran and Afghanistan. Problems of regional 
security and political stability were the focus of discussions on Eurasian political 
issues (Nourzhanov, 2012; Saidov, 2003, 2011; Ubaidulloev, 2014). Because Islam 
remains the dominant religion in Tajikistan and Arab countries, foreign policy 
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Chapter Two: Foreign Policy Behavior of Tajikistan 
 During the Soviet power over a few Central Asian countries, Moscow was the 
main location for designing and promoting effective foreign policy initiatives. After 
the Second World War, Cold War-era politics required that Tajik specialists play a 
role in establishing and implementing Soviet-style foreign policy on Muslims living 
in this region. Tajik specialists have a shared historical, religious, and cultural identity 
in working to shape bilateral agreements between Central Asian countries 
(Melkumyan, 2005; Zarifi, 2009a, b). Moreover, Tajiks who embarked on foreign 
missions acted as interpreters and trade representatives. Despite its isolation from the 
Arab world, diplomatic relations between Tajikistan and Muslim states occurred 
within the context of former Soviet rule5. Thus, post-Soviet Tajikistan faced 
significant challenges in accommodating the demands of a rapidly progressing global 
economy.  
 Along with many Central Asian states, Tajikistan relied on foreign policy 
development that considered the appropriate political reasons for implementing them 
in the first place. Drawing from Jonson (2006), applying the theoretical framework of 
“small state behavior” helps to assess international relations between Tajikistan and 
Central Asian countries. The goal was to determine the effectiveness of these 
relations as a basis for encouraging researchers into conducting studies on foreign 
policy decision-making processes within the context of Tajik-GCC relations. 
Consequently, explanations from the theory of small state behavior provide enough 
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historical context for understanding the processes of establishing bilateral trade 
agreements prior to and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
 
Defining Tajikistan 
 Ongoing scholarly debates about the effects of small state behavior cite 
factors such as population size, geographical size, and influence in international 
affairs (Goetschel, 1998; Jonson, 2006; Vital, 1967). Though some scholars argue 
that small states such as Qatar and Israel shape international relations in significant 
ways. These two states play critical roles in both a peacebuilding process and the 
formation of bilateral trade agreements (Hey, 2003). A common assumption to make 
about smaller states is that, contrary to larger states, internal political tensions do not 
foster global political crises. Alternatively, international relations between smaller 
and larger states suggest slightly more visible political tensions.  
 Without a doubt, Tajikistan qualifies as a small state based on its population 
of 8.5 million inhabitants and its size of 143,000 square kilometers. A troubling 
geographical feature of Tajikistan is that only seven percent of its arable land has 
agricultural use (International Crisis Group, 2014). From this information, a critical 
question to ask concerns which theoretical and methodological approaches can best 
help provide the most thorough understanding of possible of foreign policy behavior 
in Tajikistan. 
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 Early theoretical explanations of small state behavior rely on two definitions 
of “small power,” each determining vulnerability to invasion (Keohane, 1969; 
Rothstein, 1968). While one definition of small power refers to a state that cannot 
obtain national security based on economic and material deficiencies (Rothstein, 
1968), a different conception defines small power as one that never acts 
independently while claiming to have a significant global impact (Keohane, 1969). 
Whereas Rothstein's (1968) definition argues further that small states must obtain 
national security by relying on foreign aid through institutions, processes, and new 
political developments, Keohane's (1969) definition acts that all small states, 
regardless of networked capabilities, will have a significant global economic impact.  
 Especially for Rothstein (1969), two available patterns for small states to 
acquire political power require, on one hand, policies designed to avoid conflict and, 
on the other hand, policies modeled from the success of those used in nations with 
similar demographics. Here, the state must choose to act as an international ally or 
remain neutral. More commonly, small states align themselves with larger powers in 
efforts to gain international political recognition. Similarly, the two available patterns 
for small states to develop strong foreign policy and bilateral trade agreements with 
larger, more powerful suggest either “bandwagoning” or “balancing” (Walt, 1990). 
While the former refers to alignment between weaker and smaller states, the latter 
suggests that small states align with larger states to protect themselves from other 
external geopolitical threats.  
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 For post-Soviet Tajikistan, foreign policy development has two main goals. 
The first goal was to survive as a newly independent nation; Second goal was to 
secure foreign aid for nation-building and to implement a national security 
infrastructure6. The post-Soviet conflict provided very few opportunities for 
Tajikistan to establish diplomatic relations with countries outside of the Central Asian 
region. This could explain the research gap on Tajik-GCC relations. As Tajikistan 
necessarily relied on pro-Russian policies, Soviet hegemony of Central Asia 
continues to have some economic impacts concerning trade relations.  
 The post-Soviet conflict left Tajikistan dependent on the Kremlin to develop a 
national security platform. Moreover, as the Taliban seized power over Afghanistan 
in 1996 (Khalmukhamedov, 1998; Ubaidulloev, 2014), Russia's military presence in 
Tajikistan contributed towards national security throughout Central Asia. However, 
using Russian support to develop a national security platform for Tajikistan entailed 
that the small state would remain even more isolated from playing an influential role 
in global markets (Jonson, 1998). Neither Russia nor any Central Asian countries 
expressed interest in strengthening relations with Tajikistan.  
 The 9/11 terrorist attacks led to a turn of events for Tajikistan as American 
military troops launched air strikes on Afghanistan. Suddenly, Tajikistan had 
significant political value for Washington politicians concerning foreign policy 
development (Jonson, 2006). US-based interest in Tajikistan involved expanding 
international relations through all Asian countries. Anti-terrorism coalitions held 
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political influence over foreign policy development as Tajikistan slowly cut pre-9/11 
ties with Russia in an effort to encourage financial recovery. As a result, Tajik 
political leaders felt obliged to engage in a partnership with the United States to 
create new communication channels (Jonson, 2006). Post-9/11 relations between 
Tajikistan and Russia thus remained important because of the requirement that 
foreign policy initiatives designed to advance national interests balancing against 
potential risks. Overall, Tajik-Russian relations before and after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks relied on securing foreign aid through national security platforms and 
economic development programs.  
 
Bandwagoning Russian Interests Prior to the 9/11 Terrorist 
Attacks 
 Shortly after post-Soviet conflict, Tajikistan was in no position to develop its 
own foreign policy infrastructure without relying on neighboring states. By the late 
1990s, serious geopolitical threats to Central Asian states were imminent as the 
Taliban held political power in neighboring Afghanistan (Khalmukhamedov, 1998; 
Nourzhanov, 2012; Ubaidulloev, 2014). As a signing member of the Collective 
Security Treaty (CST), Tajikistan actively played a leading role in its relations with 
the Russian military (Jonson, 2006). By 1998, Tajikistan was a transit hub for 
transporting Russian material resources to fight against the Taliban (Sadri, 2004). The 
following year led to Tajikistan forming a strong alliance with Russia as a member of 
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the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS; Jonson, 2006; Sadri, 2004). 
Meanwhile, most Central Asian states had unstable relations with the Taliban.   
 Tajikistan found the Taliban a significant threat to national security (Jonson, 
2004; Nourzhanov, 2012; Ubaidulloev, 2014). Russian military presence was a 
precursor to the formation of Tajik foreign policy. For example, the military base in 
Tajikistan is the Russia's largest base overseas (Klein, 2009; Sadri, 2004). Despite 
fragile relations, Tajikistan relied on Russia because it had no other options, other 
than relying on the United States, were at immediate disposal (Sadri, 2004). Nearly 
twenty years prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the only other interest that the United 
States had in Tajikistan resulted in a 1992 visit by then-Secretary of State James 
Baker. US-based efforts saw Central Asian countries as politically expedient to their 
cause of extracting hydroelectric power. From this event, Tajik foreign policy 
development relied on a consolidation of efforts between the United States and Russia 
in forming democratic reforms and human rights legislation (Luong&Weinthal, 2002; 
Sadri, 2004). Unfortunately, because Tajikistan has very few oil and gas reserves, 
American politicians quickly lost interest.  
 In sum, rather than perform a balancing act between small and large states, 
Tajikistan practiced a bandwagoning approach in early foreign policy development 
after its independence from the former Soviet Union. A balancing act did not occur 
until neighboring Central Asian states aided in Tajik foreign policy development after 
the 9/11 terrorists attacks. Because of internal and external political conflicts, 
Tajikistan would eventually construct foreign policy that would anchor international 
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relations with Russia (Sadri, 2004). Of special consequence is how Tajikistan now 
relies on financial assistance from the Kremlin as deemed necessary.  
 
Post-9/11 Attempts at Balancing Policy Change in Tajikistan 
 Policy change happens in accordance with adjustments made to material and 
economic conditions (Doeser, 2008; Hermann, 1990). Four levels of policy changes 
have particular importance for how these changes affected Tajik-GCC relations. 
Policy change may occur first in the act of defining major problems and goals. 
Second, policy change may occur in alignment with methods for achieving a common 
goal. Third, policy change reflects perspectives concerning participation in global 
markets. Finally, policy change may occur in minor ways so as not to greatly affect 
current regulations (Hermann, 1990). Important for Tajikistan is the third level of 
change. 
 After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, participation in global markets played a critical 
role for the Central Asian nation to gain international legitimacy. Tajik political 
leaders saw the terrorist attacks as providing a great opportunity for gaining economic 
prosperity. Interest in US-backed counterterrorism efforts led to stronger formation of 
the Tajik military. When the United States declared war on Afghanistan, Tajik 
President Emomali Rahmon announced that he would provide political support. 
However, Tajik support for American military led to a violent attack by Afghani 
troops in the capital city of Dushanbe (Ubaidulloev, 2014). Tajik-Afghani 
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relationship clearly soured as the result of Tajik Support of US military involvement 
in Afghanistan (Glumskov, 2001). American troops went through Tajikistan to enter 
Afghanistan as part of military strategy based on never having previously occupied a 
Central Asian nation.  
 Tajik support for American military signaled an unprecedented regional 
geopolitical situation influenced by Russian defense interests (Jonson, 2004;Sadri, 
2004). For example, in January 2002, the United States rescinded on its ban of 
weapons to Tajikistan. The following month, Tajikistan joined the Partnership for 
Peace (PFP) program that provided a legal basis for cooperation with the United 
States and other official members. Cooperation efforts via PFP membership included 
joint military reforms, emergency civil planning, environmental programs, and 
scientific research (Cornell, 2004). In December 2002, President Rahmon met with 
President George W. Bush in the United States to discuss long-term counterterrorism 
efforts combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and 
illegal drugs (Saidov, 2003). Improvements in international relations between 
Tajikistan and the United States thus led to the construction of foreign policy that 
would provide the Central Asia with great opportunities to gain economic success. 
 Tajik-US relations led to the development of “open door policy” frameworks 
that involved cooperation with United Nations (UN) members (Zarifi, 2009a, b). 
Open door policy frameworks suggest a mutual respect of common interests and 
cooperation with Muslim states in Central Asia and the Middle East. Put differently, 
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open door foreign policy developments strengthened cooperation between nations 
with starkly different religious practices7.  
 Though research on relations between Tajikistan and GCC countries remains 
largely unavailable, open door foreign policy efforts strengthen Western geopolitical 
and economic interests in securing the nation against internal and external threats 
(Saidov, 2003). Despite strong Tajik-Russian relations after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
open door foreign policy efforts accounted for how Tajikistan had relatively minimal 
military presence by American troops.  
 Tajik-Russian relations involved high levels of bargaining with the Kremlin. 
Tajik political leadership demonstrated high confidence levels in diversifying 
international relations to include GCC countries. US-led coalitions played a more 
critical role in peacebuilding efforts affecting the Central Asian region (Labott, 2011). 
Because its ties with Russian and American defense establishment (Sadri, 2004), 
foreign policy efforts with greater involvement from the international community 
provide Tajikistan with significant opportunities to acquire success in the global 
economy. 
 In the next chapter, the vast literature on Tajik-Russian relations suggests an 
influence on Tajik-GCC relations in the Post-Soviet era. Because of its enrollment in 
the SCO, Tajikistan and surrounding Central Asian countries adopted open door 
policy frameworks dependent on the oil and gas industry. Religious factors also play 
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an important role in the formation of Tajik-GCC relations as these countries have a 
predominantly Muslim population.  
 As observed in the following sections of Chapter Three, open door policy 
frameworks allow Tajik-GCC relations to adopt interdependent networks of 
economic trade through foreign aid. Yet, before discussing the development of Tajik-
GCC relations, a more thorough analysis of how relations between Tajikistan and Iran 
greatly influenced current economic trends in Central Asia provides ample clues for 
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Chapter Three: Tajik-GCC Relations in the Post-Soviet Era 
 Foreign policy behavior in post-Soviet Tajikistan relied on Russian and 
American military efforts to bolster its national economy. The post-Soviet conflict 
from 1992 to 1997 made Tajikistan vulnerable against more significant political 
threats. However, as the Central Asian nation adopted open door foreign policy 
frameworks, a reliance on oil and gas production, as noted in this chapter, influenced 
international relations with other nations who have a predominantly Muslim 
population.  
 More importantly, relations between Tajikistan and Iran influenced the 
development of Tajik-GCC relations (Toone, 2012). GCC countries contribute high 
amounts of foreign aid and remittances to Tajikistan for economic development 
purposes (Mohapatra&Ratra, 2010; Naufal&Genc, 2014:Sasikumar, 2014). Yet, the 
main reason for the development of Tajik-GCC relations was to form bilateral trade 
agreements encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI) in Central Asia (Mina, 
2010). Relations between Iran and GCC countries suggest a bid for “regional 
hegemony” in competition with relations between the United Stated and Israel 
(Cronin &Masalha, 2011). However, differences in religious leadership between Iran 
and Saudi Arabia—the most powerful of GCC countries—affect Tajik-GCC relations 
as a whole.  
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Influence of Iran on Development of Tajik-GCC Relations 
 As a country in the Middle East region, Iran is like Turkey in that it occupies a 
space that could potentially bridge a gap between Tajik-GCC relations as the latter 
arguably bridges a gap between the EU and most of Asia. Because of its location, Iran 
functions as a hub for accessing more than 50 percent of the world's known oil and 
gas reserves (Kashgari, 2011). Relations between Iran and GCC countries have 
important geopolitical and economic implications for Tajik-GCC relations based on 
Iran's position within a larger global economy.  
 In demographic terms, Central Asian nations like Tajikistan have striking 
similarities with GCC countries in having a population mostly comprising Sunni 
Muslims (Kashgari, 2011). In some ways, geopolitical and economic implications of 
the hydro-energy industry in Tajikistan indicate that bilateral trade agreements 
suggest peaceful cooperation (Iapadre&Tajoli, 2013). Political leaders in Tajikistan 
recognize that GCC countries have their own material and economic needs. However, 
bilateral trade agreements between Tajikistan and GCC countries rely on differences 
in trade preferences and overcoming shortcomings often found in quantitative 
statistical studies (Iapadre&Tajolik, 2013). As with Tajik-Iranian relations, Tajik-
GCC relations relay on networks of local and regional networks of trade structure 
reliant upon agreements made within a global trading system.  
 Because of Iran's geopolitical location, the Middle Eastern nation serves as a 
focal point for understanding increased “regionalization” through regional trade 
agreements (Iapadre&Tajoli, 2013, p. S90). As global networks of economic trade 
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become more regionalized, one important trend noted in the policy research literature 
is the assumption of decreased costs in transportation and communication. As 
Tajikistan and GCC countries establish bilateral trade agreements, regionalization of 
economic trade networks suggests that all countries involved will increase the number 
of trading partners while businesses in both the Middle East and Central Asia trade 
from longer distances (Herzig, 2004; Iapadre&Tajoli, 2013). This literature also 
showed how the need to regionalize economic trade networks decreases over time as 
emerging countries succeeded in apply development frameworks. From 1992 to 1997, 
the post-Soviet conflict in Tajikistan shaped the potential to regionalize economic 
interests as Russia and Iran played leading roles in peace negotiations (Herzig, 2004; 
Sadri, 2004). Along with the active support of other regional states, the UN 
coordinated efforts to improve diplomatic relations between Iran and Tajikistan was 
based on regional economic interests.  
 Iran's geopolitical position allows itself to influence relations with Tajikistan 
as much as it influences Tajik-GCC relations. Iran views itself as having a cultural 
status as an inheritor of Classical Greek and Roman civilization and as having a 
political history of independent statehood (Cronin&Masalha, 2011. p. 3). Compared 
to the GCC countries, Iran has diversified economy, advanced scientific and 
technological developments, and a strong military. Moreover, the GCC countries 
have a history derived from British Imperialism (Cronin&Masalha, 2011). In 
religious and sectarian terms, Iran excludes Shi'a Muslim identity from foreign policy 
development that is addressed towards Tajikistan. This exclusion greatly influences 
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the development of Tajik-GCC relations as most of the countries involved in bilateral 
trade agreements have a Sunni Muslim population.  
 As observed in discussions of open door policy frameworks, the influence of 
Tajik-Iranian relations implies that relations between Tajikistan and GCC countries 
have a unified religious backing. This geopolitical and economic context ultimately 
suggests that religious and national identity have inextricable links with important 
research implications for studying the effects of bilateral trade agreements between 
the Middle East and Central Asia (Atkin, 1992). With respect to Shi'a Muslims as 
having a religious identity, ethnic groups do not themselves have a national identity.  
 Rather, nationalities act as an inherently political form of social organization 
that determines the social and cultural goals of a state (Atkin, 1992). Prior to Soviet 
nationalization processes in the 1920s, native Tajiks identified as belonging to a 
Muslim community that was subdivided into mutually hostile groups. Ethnicity 
served as an ideologically divisive tool for nationalization though other divisions 
related to dynastic legacies, political elitism, and tribalism served to create economic 
subdivisions (Atkin, 1992). In contemporary Tajikistan, defining an ethnic identity 
has interchangeable ties with religious affiliation and nationality8. However, 
inhabitants of Tajikistan depend on religious convictions to foster a greater sense of 
belonging. More interesting is how Muslim-identified inhabitants of Tajikistan claim 
a national identity as influenced by Turkey as was the case in Uzbekistan (Atkin, 
1992). While Tajikistan originally belonged to earlier empires, Tajikistan did not 
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begin to develop a national identity until 1924 as an independent republic within the 
former Soviet Union. Yet, the history of developing a Tajik national identity is not 
without controversy. 
 In fact, the links between Tajik and Iranian national identity distinguish 
between ethnic groups speaking Persian and ethnic groups speaking Turkic languages 
(Atkin, 1992; Bertoncini et al., 2012). Unfortunately, very little research to date links 
the history of Tajik and Iranian national identity development as influential to the 
emergence of bilateral trade agreements between Tajikistan and GCC countries. As 
noted earlier, ethnicity and religious affinity shape national identity while the latter 
eventually social and cultural development. Ideological discourses about political 
infrastructures between Tajikistan and Iran shape Tajik-GCC relations such that 
governance structures enter debates concerning foreign policy (Sadri, 2004; 
Wiseman, 2010). For example, education systems in the Middle East and Central 
Asian nations rely on the establishment of international norms regarding how 
education implies success in a global economy. Since the religious affinity of these 
countries effectively utilizes standards considered extremely conservative under most 
Western standards, reforms to education policy must draw influence from possible 
reforms to economic policy.  
 Because success in a global economy depends on applications of Western 
standards, some of the literature implies that Tajik-Iranian and Tajik-GCC relations 
should have the capacity to strike a balance between the types of that education that 
conforms with religious or national identity and education that serves a primary 
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objective of economic expansion (Wiseman, 2010). Expansion of economic trade 
between Tajikistan and GCC countries suggests that Iran plays a central role in 
fostering a “world culture” through education (Wiseman, 2010, p. 21-2). As a 
geopolitical strategy, education shapes a world culture through a process of 
“normative isomorphism” that Iran likely considered when influencing Tajik-GCC 
relations (Wiseman, 2010, p. 22). Instead of relying on bandwagoning, Tajik-Iranian 
relations depend on foreign policy strategies designed to balance alignments between 
smaller and larger states. Similarly, Tajik-Russian relations also depend on balance of 
foreign policy strategies (Sadri, 2004). By extension, Tajik-GCC relations must also 
rely on a balancing act of foreign policy development as other Central Asian nations 
have no special interests in furthering the economic progress of Tajikistan. 
 Strategies for developing a world culture through education programs suggest 
that Tajikistan must adopt the social and cultural norms of Iran especially with 
respect to Muslim religious identity. As Tajikistan has a history of internalizing of 
Russian social and cultural norms, relations with Iran run into conflict with respect 
for shaping local and regional cultures (Wiseman, 2010). Iran has its own intellectual 
and cultural history in Central Asia based on a Persian legacy rooted in 
Zoroastrianism (Bekhandria, 1994; Kashgari, 2011). Furthermore, Iran has a history 
of tumultuous relations with GCC countries after the 1979 Iranian Revolution 
declared a break from Western ideals of social, cultural, and economic progress 
rooted in religious identity (Kashgari, 2011). From that historical moment, 
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international relations between Iran and the GCC countries remained in a state of 
severe disrepair.  
 Many of the GCC countries base their legal system almost entirely on Shari'a 
law leading Iranian education systems to depict Saudis as completely hostile to 
developing foreign policy initiatives with Iran and Central Asian nations outside of 
Tajikistan (Kashgari, 2011). On the other hand, Tajikistan and many Central Asian 
nations have a largely secular foreign policy accepting of both Persian and Iranian 
interests9. Religion occupies only a small portion of many lives of contemporary 
Tajiks, though Iran and Tajikistan celebrate many of the same official religious 
holidays observed by followers of Islam (Kashgari, 2011). As a result, both religion 
and education shape relations between Tajikistan and Iran as much as those factors 
shape Tajik-GCC relations.  
 Aside from education, Tajik-GCC relations present significant advantages in 
terms of food exports from Central Asian countries. Because Tajikistan has few 
airports, many food exports would need to pass through Afghanistan, Russia, or Iran 
to reach their destination (Woertz, Pradhan, Biberovic & Jingzhong, 2008). FDI 
inflows from food exports involve local politics and discussions of international 
accountability concerning how to handle political conflicts. Regional conflicts in the 
Middle East complicate how Tajikistan exports food because of how they pose 
significant threats to potential investments in agriculture (Woertz et al., 2008). 
Outside of regional conflicts, a global economy reliant upon Western standards 
                                                
9 Personal Interview: Loiqnazar Imomi, Dushanbe, Feb. 2016 
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implies that agricultural expansion in both Tajikistan and GCC countries must rely on 
Russia and countries in North Africa.  
 Rising oil prices complicate agricultural development even further as most 
political infrastructures in Central Asian nations like Tajikistan depend on policies 
formed while Russia belonged to the former Soviet Union (Woertz et al., 2008). More 
troubling is how regional conflicts include threats of a nuclear standoff that deplete 
global food supplies. Yet, despite mounting concerns about regional conflicts, the 
material and economic flows of trade influence the capacity to which Tajikistan can 
transform its current status as a largely developing nation into one that flourishes in a 
global economy10. 
 
Material and Economic Trade between Tajikistan and GCC 
Countries 
 The Gulf States contribute high amounts of foreign aid to Tajikistan11. 
Because Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait have the highest economic 
influence on the Central Asian nation, Islamic/Muslim Identity plays a significant role 
in establishing effective bilateral trade agreements (Villanger, 2007). Though these 
GCC countries mean well in providing foreign aid to Tajikistan, they follow what 
Wright (2011) defined as checkbook diplomacy. Financial assistance in this manner 
often involves a leveraging of soft power in core and periphery countries. Wealthier 
                                                
10 Personal Interview: Erkin Kasymov, Dushanbe, Dec. 2015 
11 Personal Interview: Azamsho Sharifi, Dushanbe, Feb. 2016	
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states in the core rely on their financial capabilities to solve disputes and gain a status 
as peacekeeper.  
 For instance, Saudi Arabia provides the most financial assistance to Tajikistan 
because of its hegemonic position (Wright, 2011). Saudi Arabia is not only the largest 
of GCC countries; it also has the largest economy in this region. Other GCC countries 
like the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait effectively develop foreign policy efforts as 
bandwagoning off of Saudi Arabia. Bandwagoning in the GCC countries not only 
helps individual nations, it also establishes clear roles about who controls global 
economic flows (Nonneman, 2005). Control of oil and gas production in Saudi Arabia 
foments their hegemonic role as influencing how other GCC countries bandwagon 
foreign policy.  
 National security interests also play a role in how relations between Tajikistan 
and GCC countries reflect a strategic partnership with the United States. Such 
interests reflect an increased demand for oil production in the Gulf region. Arguably, 
increased oil production encourages regional economic stability (Sokolsky, 2003). 
Particularly for the United States, peacebuilding efforts in the Gulf region reflect a 
political interest towards greater national security. Cold War-era relations between 
the United States and Russia influenced these interests, though converging interests 
after the post-Soviet conflict in Tajikistan and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to a 
recognition of diverse interests in securing a successful role in the global economy. 
Concerning Tajik-GCC relations, the findings of this chapter suggest that each of 
these countries engages in small state behavior mentioned throughout this study. 
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Based on the collection of interview data evolving from questions about establishing 
priorities for Tajik-GCC relations, one clear inference to draw from the findings is 
that the combined interests of seeking political autonomy while promoting national 
security interests are two interesting yet conflicting actions of foreign policy 
development.  
 
Contemporary Tajik-GCC Relations 
 After the initial considerations of open door policy frameworks, Tajik political 
leadership sought to strengthen international relations with the GCC states and 
surrounding Central Asian nations. In exploring the drivers of improvements in these 
relationships, this chapter analyzes interview data with questions drawn from the 
research literature. It was decided to use the qualitative method for collecting the 
primary data, because that type of interviewing is more flexible and the interviewer 
may bring up any new questions due to respondent’s replies. Total of nine in depth 
interviews with the average duration of 40-50 minutes each took place in Doha and 
Dushanbe respectively. The interviews were held in English, Russian and Tajik 
languages, depending on the will of the participants. As the fluent speaker of all three 
mentioned languages, gathered data then was translated into English by the 
researcher.  
Participants for the interview have been selected based on their direct involvement, 
whether politically, academically or economically to the Tajik-GCC relations 
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(Appendix 2). The importance of conducting the interview with the right person who 
has the knowledge of this research topic is crucial since it would increase the 
accuracy in the answers. 
The interview questions are as follows:  
• What do you see as the main priorities in the relations between Tajikistan and 
GCC? 
• Apart from having formal relations after the independence of Tajikistan, in 
which year do you think the active relations with the GCC States began?  
• What actions are the government taking to increase cultural exchange between 
Tajikistan and GCC States? 
• What actions are the government taking to increase socio-economic relations 
between Tajikistan and GCC States? 
• What actions are the governments of both sides taking to increase 
political/foreign policy cooperation? 
• What are the main obstacles for the better cooperation between Tajikistan and 
the GCC?  
• How do you describe the current state of Tajik-GCC relations?  
• What are your recommendations that could strengthen the relations between 
two parties?  
Interview data contained findings that highlighted three main priorities for Tajikistan 
to develop economic cooperation in the form of hydro-energy, tourism, mining and 
financial services. These four economic sectors have the most significant impact for 
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Tajikistan. Interview data also indicated the importance of effective political relations 
and the importance of attracting the investments from the GCC States. It is very 
crucial for Tajik government to show country’s untapped opportunities via 
promotional campaigns and cultural exchanges with an aim to attract attention of 
GCC investors. Serious work should be done to decrease the barriers for the potential 
investors, as we see that there is an interest from the Gulf States to invest in 
Tajikistan. Capital protection schemes should be implemented. Investor should be 
absolutely sure that his capital will be protected by the government. Along with that, 
Because Tajikistan is a largely Muslim country, religious and cultural ties to GCC 
countries play a significant role in encouraging cooperation in foreign policy 
development. 
 Concerning how Tajikistan has international relations specifically with Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar, interview data indicated a relationship with foreign policy and 
internal political stability. If neither of these countries have internal stability, foreign 
policy efforts will not have positive outcomes. Moreover, because of its major 
economic role, Saudi Arabia cannot provide as much foreign aid to Tajikistan as it 
would like as political instability increases the risk for corruption.  
 Interview data indicated further that prior to 2004-2006, Tajik-GCC relations 
were only based on formal recognition. Difficulties in cultural exchange suggested 
that low levels of understanding religious differences between Shi'a and Sunni 
Muslims. Though Tajik Muslims have Persian roots, their practice follows the Sunni 
tradition despite a common misconception that they follow the Shi'a tradition. 
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Historically, relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran demonstrate a great deal of 
turbulence. However, as suggested from the interview data, Tajikistan can be an 
active participant in the negotiation process and act as a buffer against further conflict 
between the two Middle East nations.  
 Finally, interview data indicated that while Bahrain and Oman do not play any 
diplomatic roles in relations with Tajikistan, limited support from the UAE 
demonstrates a continuous pattern. Foreign aid from Kuwait to Tajikistan between 
2007 and 2008 proved helpful in the midst of humanitarian crisis. Despite its 
extremely limited involvement, Oman provided financial assistance to Tajikistan 
when it experienced another humanitarian crisis between 2011 and 2012. 
Humanitarian aid from Oman was unique because of how this GCC country provided 
financial support of up to $3 million for construction efforts in affected areas. The 
results also showed that although relations with Oman not on the high level, Muscat 
however is ready to assist and cooperate when needed.   
 Overall, interview data suggested that the strengthening of Tajik-GCC 
relations depends on collaboration and open door policy frameworks. Strengthening 
these relations requires that political leaders schedule and hold meetings that address 
the most critical barriers to success. Tajik-GCC relations affect foreign policy 
development in considering the effects on countries in the Central Asian region. 
Turbulent relations with Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attack present one 
significant barrier to promote economic success for Tajikistan. However, as also 
suggested by the interview data, peace and stability in Afghanistan remain top 
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priority not only for Tajikistan’s internal stability and security, but also for the 
former’s economic prosperity.  Peaceful situation in Afghanistan will give Tajikistan 




 Relations between Tajikistan and Saudi Arabia have a three-phase historical 
pattern. The first phase reflected the establishment of formal and informal contacts 
between political leaders and foreign ministers of both nations. Saudi Arabia was also 
one of the first nations to recognize Tajikistan as having political independence from 
the Soviet Union12. The Kingdom was one of the first GCC States to channel 
substantial amount of financial aid to Tajikistan. In particular, from independence and 
until 1999 Saudi Arabia channeled aid that was equal to $217 million.13 During the 
First Gulf War from 1989 until 1993, international relations between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia indicated major tensions between ideological and pragmatic approaches with 
respect to diplomacy (Amiri, Samsu, Korshidi & Piri, 2010). During this time, both 
Iran and Saudi Arabia explored commitments to regionalizing economic interests 
based on religious identification with Islam (Herzig, 2004). Unfortunately, this first 
                                                
12 Personal Interview: Azamsho Sharifi, Dushanbe, Feb. 2016 
13 Archive of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Republic of Tajikistan, 
department of Foreign Trade and Economic Policies, International Relations division. Folder on 
Tajikistan-Saudi, “Memorandum of Understanding between Tajikistan and the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia”, Dushanbe 1992, p.13   
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phase suggested little promise for cooperation especially as alliances between Saudi 
Arabia and the United States strengthened. 
 Concerning Tajik-Saudi relations, the Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs paid 
close attention to how it developed foreign policy efforts and bilateral trade 
agreements in alignment with those of Saudi Arabia14. The second phase reflected a 
period of cooperation between Tajikistan and Saudi Arabia from 1997 to 2001 as 
marked by various political, socioeconomic, cultural, and humanitarian shifts. 
Multiple visits by foreign ministers and associated work groups facilitated the 
direction of this cooperation phase. The final phase launched in 2003 provided a 
launching point for discussing bilateral trade deals to bolster Tajik-Saudi relations. 
Bilateral trade agreements developed during this final phase established a legal 
framework for cooperation in economics, investment, culture, technology, sports, and 
youth affairs15. However, Tajik and Saudi embassies for each respective nation did 
not open until 2008 and 2010, respectively. Yet, when Tajikistan faced a 
humanitarian crisis caused by one of the coldest winters in history, Saudi Arabia 
provided $10 million in foreign aid (Najibullah, 2008). In contrast, the United States 
provided only $2.5 million while Japan provided a paltry $90,00016. 
 Recent studies in policy research cite how relations between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia face complications due to the significance of Shi'a Muslim communities.  
Disputes between Iran and Saudi Arabia shaped the formation of economic trade 
                                                
14 Personal Interview: Erkin Kasymov, Dushanbe, Dec. 2015	
15 Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan, reports of the Department 
of Asian and African countries, folder on Tajikistan and Saudi Arabian relations, 2007, page 12.  
16 Personal Interview: Ardasher Qodiri, Doha, May 2015	
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agreements between Tajikistan and the remaining GCC countries. In return, Saudi 
Arabia fears the factors driving Iran's potential to influence foreign policy 
development between Middle East and Central Asian states (Cronin&Masalha, 2011). 
Moreover, alliances between Saudi Arabia and the United States shape Tajik-Iranian 
relations especially as Iran and Oman discussed possible joint military programs in 
2008. Three years prior to these discussions, Prince Saud al-Faisal, then foreign 
minister of Saudi Arabia conceded to the Sunni insurgency of Shi'a Muslims in Iraq 
launching a proxy war with Iran (Cronin &Masalha, 2011). As Saudi nationals fought 
in Iraq, relations with Iran feared that relations between GCC countries would entail a 
trade boycott.  
 During the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, coordinated 
efforts with the United States served a primary interest of protecting the Saudi 
monarchy (Aydin, 2013). Economically, the Arab Spring forced Saudi Arabia and 
other GCC countries to provide mutual support for Bahrain and Oman while 
competition with Qatar intensified. International relations between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran became more turbulent as both countries struggled to occupy a hegemonic 
geopolitical position bridging the Middle East and Central Asia (Aydin, 2013). 
Moreover, Saudi support for Syria during the early stages of the Arab Spring shaped 
led to sharply conflicted relations with the United States. In other words, the turbulent 
history of Saudi-Iranian relations has significant economic impacts for Tajikistan17. 
                                                
17 Personal interview: Barotzoda Faizullo, Dushanbe, Feb. 2016 
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 Overall, while GCC countries provided employment to millions of migrant 
workers over twenty years, the research literature presents very little information 
about remittances sent from Saudi Arabia to Tajikistan (Naufal&Garc, 2014). As 
follows, the amounts of remittances sent from Saudi Arabia to Tajikistan increases as 
the Saudi economy grows. The macroeconomic effects of remittance flows from 
Saudi Arabia suggest that expansion of local economies will result in higher rates of 
returns (Naufal&Garc, 2014). However, higher rates of domestic returns in Saudi 
Arabia lead to lower remittance flows as higher rates of foreign increase such flows. 
Political instability between Iran and Saudi Arabia thus has an economic impact on 
Tajik-GCC relations. As Iran and Saudi Arabia compete for regional economic 
domination while having an explicitly anti-Western, remittance flows from the 
Middle East to Tajikistan affect fiscal and monetary policies.  
 Unfortunately, agricultural subsidies for Saudi Arabia remain economically 
feasible and environmentally unsustainable (Woertz et al., 2008). Saudi Arabia now 
plans to phase out domestic wheat production by 2016 to preserve water resources. 
Phasing out wheat production will make way for the production of fruits and 
vegetables that will likely increase the monetary value of crops (Woertz et al., 2008). 
Yet, as is the case with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), sharp increases in 
population, declining incentives for entering agriculture as an economic practice, and 
lack of water resources shape Tajik-GCC relations on a basis of an ability to export 
goods between nations (Woertz et al., 2008). As global food markets continue to have 
declining surpluses, countries in South and Southeast Asia place restrictions on what 
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foods they can export. As a result, open-door policy frameworks may involve 
Tajikistan placing restrictions on food imports in coming years. Future research 
efforts should therefore focus on how food production in Tajikistan and Saudi Arabia, 
along with the remaining GCC countries, shapes foreign policy directives.  
 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
 The UAE is Tajikistan's largest trading partner. Tajik leaders express high 
level of comfort with investing their money in the urban centers of Dubai and Abu 
Dhabi18, as these two cities facilitated its role as a key economic player in recent 
years (Aydin, 2013). Having a population of nearly eight million—with nearly 75 
percent identifying as foreign expatriates—the UAE consists of seven emirates 
scattered on the Hormuz strait of the Persian Gulf with six tribes dominating 
monarchical rule. For example, the Bani Yas tribe rules the emirates of Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai (Aydin, 2013). The tribal ruler of Abu Dhabi is also the President while 
the tribal ruler of Dubai stands in line as the next Vice President. Nevertheless, Dubai 
is a regional and global leader in economic diversification such that its food 
processing plants and cement factors provide expatriate workers with some incentive 
to stay. The city of Dubai has a booming tourism industry largely generated by the 
use of expatriate labor (Aydin, 2013). The tourism industry in Dubai also provides 
wealthy Europeans with a vacation spot during holiday.  
                                                
18 Personal interview: Anonymous speaker, Dushanbe, Jan. 2016 
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 Concerning migration issues, the UAE's has nearly 50 percent of its labor 
force originating from South Asian countries of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. As of 2013, only 16 percent of the UAE population 
identified as Shi'a Muslim, while 80 percent identified as Sunni Muslim (Aydin, 
2013). With an average GDP per capita of $48,000 US, the UAE has ten percent of 
global oil reserves. The emirate and city of Dubai abides by a free market economic 
philosophy by investing in global projects that attract the attention of business 
executives in recent years19. However, the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 
brought on economic recession to the UAE.  
 Despite having a status as the leading emirate to diversify a national and 
regional economy, Dubai had to borrow money from Abu Dhabi while it also had to 
postpone loan repayments to that emirate (Aydin, 2013). The Arab Spring movement 
shaped internal economic relations within the UAE at local levels to ward off public 
outcries. Between Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the two emirates have administrative veto 
power in either providing or prohibiting the uses of intelligence, military, and police 
force in the UAE (Aydin, 2013). Moreover, the UAE has a Federal National Council 
that oversees the distribution of economic and political power given to each emirate. 
Larger emirates like Dubai and Abu Dhabi receive most of the economic spoils while 
smaller states inevitably receive very little.  
 As mentioned in the previous section on Saudi Arabia, the UAE has an 
agricultural industry that, despite its promises for the Middle East, remains largely 
                                                
19 Personal interview: Zuhursho Rahmatulloev, Dushanbe, Feb. 2016 
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unsustainable in economic terms (Aydin, 2013; Woertz et al., 2008). Agricultural 
markets in the UAE have a greater exposure to market volatility than they do in Saudi 
Arabia (Koren&Tenreyro, 2010). Issues concerning food security in local and 
regional geographic contexts prompt both the UAE and Tajikistan to consider what 
types of agricultural investments each nation should make (Woertz et al., 2008). 
Importantly, the UAE currently invests in technological innovations to produce 
agricultural products (Aydin, 2013). To make for its lacking agricultural sector, the 
UAE has a relatively successful industry that provides intermediate levels of 
economic self-sufficiency (Aydin, 2013). Yet, regardless of food security concerns, 
Tajikistan is one of several Central Asian nations with an increase in FDI flows from 
both China and GCC counties. FDI flows draw from developments in the 
telecommunications and energy sectors. Despite enhancements to these two 
industries, Tajikistan needs to put significant efforts in transportation sector to be able 
to help with this ongoing concern20.  
 Tajikistan still has only one direct flight to the city of Dubai. Moreover, the 
UAE tends to avoid political discussions in preferring to address business and trade 
affairs. International relations between Tajikistan and the UAE did not start until 
1995 when President Rahmon met with UAE's Prime Minister to sign memorandums 
against double taxation21. In August 1997, Tajikistan opened trade mission to the 
                                                
20 Personal interview: Anonymous speaker, Dushanbe, Feb. 2016 
21	Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan, Department of Asian and 
African countries, folder on Tajikistan and UAE agreements, “Declaration about the further evolution 
of the relations between TJ and UAE”, Dushanbe, 1995, p. 14-15	
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UAE. Conversely, the UAE channeled $250,000 in foreign aid to Tajikistan22. 
Regarding FDI flows, Tajikistan does not have the authority to nationalize or 
confiscate foreign investments. Although little research has been done about FDI 
flows between Tajikistan and the UAE, one observation worth noting is how foreign 
investments between these nations represent a type of foreign aid for the former 
(Woertz et al., 2008). Exceptions to restrictions against nationalizing or confiscating 
foreign investments occur in cases of natural disasters, epidemics, and other cases as 
decided upon by Parliament. In these cases, investors originally intent on investing in 
economic development receive compensation provided that money used in foreign aid 
complied with legal standards.  
Despite the research gap on FDI flows between the UAE and Tajikistan, some 
of the literature noted how both nations work to provide each other with a sense of 
international and regional support. While the UAE is a “rentier state” that earns most 
of its income through production in the oil and gas sector, investments made in 
Western countries shape foreign policy development between this GCC country and 
Tajikistan (Aydin, 2013, p. 127). A rentier economy has significant importance for 
continued oil production in the Middle East and Central Asia because of an inability 
to establish multi-purpose economic systems. Even after the Arab Spring movement, 
the UAE has around eight million US dollars invested in the oil and gas industry 
(Aydin, 2013). Rentier states use oil money to keep the monarchy at bay especially as 
                                                
22	Archive of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Republic of Tajikistan, 
department of Foreign Trade and Economic Policies, International Relations division. Inquiry on 
bilateral Tajik-UAE relations, 1997, p. 16-17	
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domestic policy suggests that UAE citizens do not participate fully in political 
processes. In other words, The Arab Spring has implications for Tajik-GCC relations, 
as this contemporary historical event suggests that economic success in a global 
economy depends on how much political clout nations give to citizens. Relations 
between the UAE and Tajikistan have an overlooked historical past suggesting early 
efforts at developing bilateral trade agreements in regional and global contexts. In 
2005, the first Tajik work groups led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs visited 
political leaders in the UAE to discuss the possibility of implementing effective 
bilateral trade agreements. After several meetings over the course of two years, Tajik-
UAE relations strengthened. December of 2007 launched the first high-profile visit of 
the UAE Foreign Minister to Tajikistan. The UAE Foreign Minister stressed the 
importance of opening diplomatic relations to boost international cooperation 
(Ergasheva, 2007; “Skoro v Dushanbe,” 2007). Until 2012, no major actions 
bolstered Tajik-UAE relations though the UAE regularly disbursed foreign aid to 
Tajikistan23. The annual reports indicate that Tajikistan for some time has been the 
second biggest receiver of the UAE foreign aid in the Central Asian region, ranking 
just after Kazakhstan (Appendix 3). 
 Interestingly, GCC countries often fail to report how much aid they donate 
because of a lack in regulatory mechanisms enforcing full disclosure of charitable 
contributions (Villanger, 2007). Disclosing such amounts would weaken internal 
relations for religious reasons. Even more important is how maintaining a largely 
                                                
23 Personal interview: Mukhtar Aliev, Doha, May 2015 
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expatriate labor force in the UAE affects international relations with Tajikistan 
(Naufal&Gerc, 2014). Unfortunately, no information to date indicates how 
immigration flows from Tajikistan to the UAE affect the development of bilateral 
trade agreements through open door policy frameworks. Future research may benefit 
from investigating the macro- and micro-economic effects of labor migration on FDI 
flows between the UAE and Tajikistan (Naufal&Gerc, 2014). Studies linking the 
economic factors of migration flows to UAE with Tajik-GCC relations allow 
researchers to analyze the effects of FDI flows on local and regional economies. As a 
nation sending large amounts of remittances to Tajikistan, an inference to make is that 
the UAE has a substantial migrant labor force from the Central Asian country. 
Because the GCC countries have a global status as sending some of the largest 
remittances to home countries, the policy implications drawn from insights found in 
future studies have significance for advancing a more developed understanding of 
Tajik-GCC relations.  
 In the next section on Qatar, Tajik-GCC relations confirm the theoretical 
insights of Wiseman (2010) regarding institutional isomorphism in foreign policy 
development. Based on policies regarding how students in GCC countries receive an 
education to succeed in a global economy, concerns about the hope for Qatar in 
succeeding as a leader in technological innovations often result in clashes over which 
policies have the most relevant fit for developing more balanced foreign policy 
directives. Unfortunately, no information to date emphasizes the importance of 
education within the context of Tajik-GCC relations. However, with respect to the 
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role of Qatar as a leader in technological innovations, adopting Western standards 
appears most inevitable (Wiseman, 2010). Institutional isomorphism in Qatar, in 
other words, shapes Tajik-GCC relations such that balanced foreign policy directives 




 As one of the smaller GCC countries, Qatar enjoys a privileged place in the 
Tajik-GCC relations due to a mutual interest in cooperation and continuous efforts in 
boosting bilateral relations. With the national capital city of Doha operating as an 
economic hub, Qatar has a budding media and entertainment industry largely 
influenced by the popularity of the Al-Jazeera news network. Extending in to Central 
Asia, Qatar was among the first GCC states to recognize Tajikistan’s independence. 
The first milestone followed from the visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Tajikistan to Qatar. During that meeting, memorandums on the coordination on 
various political issues, trade and economic relations and as well as development of 
bilateral cultural relations were signed24. Official archives indicate that since 2000, 
there was a very low level of exchange in terms of visits or cooperation. However, 
May of 2007 suggested a turning point in Tajik-Qatari relations with a special focus 
on the investment opportunities in Tajikistan.  
                                                
24	Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan, Department of Asian and 
African countries, folder on Tajikistan and Qatar, “Declaration of further relations development 
between Tajikistan and Qatar”, 1993.	
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 The negotiations of that visit resulted in the signing of four documents: the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
MoU between the Chambers of Commerce as well as inter-state agreements on 
Protection of Mutual Investments and Economic, Trade and Technical Support. 
Meanwhile, the first Tajik-Qatari business forum was also conducted in the 
framework of that visit (Ergasheva, 2007). In July of 2007, the Qatari senior 
delegation paid official work visit to Tajikistan. The Minister of Economy and 
Finance, Yousef Hussain Kamal, led the discussion on industrial, energy, construction 
and banking sectors (Mannonov, 2007). Negotiations ultimately had an economic 
impact of increasing FDI flows from Qatar into Tajikistan25. However, the only 
scholarly literature available concerning this impact addresses global FDI levels since 
2010 (Toone, 2012). The implications of this economic impact suggest that the focus 
of negotiations was on promoting short-term growth. At the same time, the available 
research on FDI focuses on investment funds flowing into Qatar.  
 Despite the research gap, FDI inflows between Qatar and Tajikistan have 
implications for interpreting percentages of similar inflows on a global scale (Toone, 
2012). Qatar is one of many GCC countries that continue to resist Western economic 
influences particularly from the United States and the EU (Cronin &Masalha, 2011). 
Tajik-Iranian relations further shape its position as a global political leader in terms of 
foreign policy development. In 2008, Qatar used its political position as a member of 
the UN Security Council to vote against nuclear sanctions in Iran as the nation's 
                                                
25 Personal interview: Ardasher Qodiri, Doha, May 2015 
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military general threatened to close off the Strait of Hormuz through “blitzkrieg” 
tactics (Cronin &Masalha, 2011, p. 13). Voting against nuclear sanctions in Iran 
resulted from mounting concerns over the contamination of regional water supplies 
that would have further damaged an already weak agricultural infrastructure. 
However, while Qatar voted against nuclear sanctions in Iran, no information is 
available about how this affected international relations with Tajikistan.  
 For GCC countries, the purpose of voting against nuclear sanctions was to 
exercise a type of regional economic control with supervision from political elites 
(Cronin&Masalha, 2011). In a seemingly underhanded move, French nuclear 
manufacturer Areva signed an electricity distribution and transmission deal with the 
Qatari government worth 700 million US dollars. This deal allowed Western firms to 
achieve economic and political objectives in Qatar and surrounding GCC countries as 
relations with the US served to increase production of nuclear technology 
(Cronin&Masalha, 2011). Considering how Qatar has a history of strong monarchical 
rule, open-door policy frameworks in this context have significant research 
implications for future studies in Tajik-GCC relations.  
 Future studies could investigate how adopting Western beliefs in 
technological innovation influenced the current political system. While Qatar 
liberalized its economic policies and re-wrote its constitution in the mid-1990s, the 
national government placed restrictions on how much the Al-Jazeera network could 
criticize political elites. For instance, the Qatari government strictly prohibits its 
citizens from engaging in public protest (Aydin, 2013). Moreover, during the Iraq 
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War and the Arab Spring, withdrawal of military forces did little to quell tensions 
between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims.  
 Though Qatar has the potential to become an influential economic player in 
relations with Tajikistan, a tendency for exercising strong military force has severe 
regional consequences for Central Asia (Aydin, 2013). Striking a balance in foreign 
policy directives between Qatar and Tajikistan should not involve excessive use of 
military force to settle international conflicts. The post-Soviet civil war and the 
occupation of military troops in Afghanistan pose potential danger to national 
security and economic progress.  
 Concerns about economic progress in balancing Tajik-GCC relations suggest 
that excessive military force increases risks for market volatility and sector-specific 
shocks (Koren&Tenreyro, 2010). Given the economic history of GCC countries, 
Qatar has the capacity to learn from its past mistakes. By embracing some Western 
standards, open door policy frameworks granted Qatar with opportunities to develop 
an influential media and communications industry.  
 The media and communications industry in Tajikistan could benefit from 
establishing contact with news networks like Al-Jazeera to spark global discussions 
of foreign policy affecting Tajik-GCC relations26. As in Kuwait, economic volatility 
in Qatar has an idiosyncratic history unique to specific industrial sectors 
(Koren&Tenreyro, 2010). The risk for shocks resulting from such an idiosyncratic 
history suggests that market volatility relies on specific country-related components 
                                                
26 Personal interview: Erkin Kasymov, Dushanbe, Dec. 2015 
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reflective of domestic policy. By extension, foreign policy directives that establish 
peaceful Tajik-GCC relations suggest a need for improvements in domestic policy.  
 
Kuwait 
 As another of the smaller GCC countries, Kuwait has an economic history 
shaped by oil discovery in the 1930s. While the United Kingdom had placed an initial 
stake in Kuwaiti oil fields, in early 1970s, Kuwait led to independence and full 
control over oil production in the nation (Koren&Tenreyro, 2010). However, the 
1980s brought on consecutive years of negative economic growth with losses of at 
least 3.6 percent per year. Economic shrinkage during the 1980s resulted in Kuwait 
having difficulties of achieving growth at the beginning of the 1990s 
(Koren&Tenreyro, 2010). Despite difficulties, Kuwait started to experience annual 
economic growth rates of at least 4.4 percent. Market volatility remained high in 
nearly all GCC countries with the exception of Oman. 
 Strikingly, a surge in economic growth during the 1990s heightened market 
volatility as the First Gulf War represented an idiosyncratic economic event 
presenting greater risk for shocks (Koren&Tenreyro, 2010). Since the 1990s, 
Kuwait's economy continues to experience economic growth despite continued 
resistance against fully adopting Western-based policies based on a strong Muslim 
identity. Unfortunately, very little research information was available at the time of 
this study to conduct a thorough analysis of how market volatility affects international 
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relations between Kuwait and Tajikistan. However, regarding economic policy 
between the two nations, Kuwait remains the only GCC country that uses a “basket” 
of exchange units while including the US dollar as the central unit of currency for 
trade (Naufal&Gerc, 2014, p. 10). Even fewer studies examine relationships between 
FDI, remittances, and economic growth with respect towards the development of 
foreign policy directives. Despite this research gap, some of the literature suggests a 
complicated relationship.  
        First interactions between Kuwait and Tajikistan can be dated back to 1992. In 
February of that year a delegation from Kuwait consisting of representative from the 
Kuwaiti Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Oil, Kuwait Development 
Fund and other high-rank authorities visited Tajikistan. Later, in April 1995 the 
President of Tajikistan paid an official visit to the State of Kuwait. Worth noting that 
this was the first official Tajik President’s visit to the Gulf States. President 
Rahmon’s visit culminated in signing several cooperation agreements in science, 
trade, economic and technical support, as well as support for mutual investments and 
protocol on bilateral MFA consultations.27 
Until recently, Tajikistan cooperated with Kuwait within the framework of the 
multilateral cooperation. Tajikistan received loan money from the Kuwait Fund for 
Arab Economic Development for several projects. However, an analysis of the 
Annual Reports indicated that the loan provision started in 2003 (Kuwait Fund for 
                                                
27	Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan, Department of Asian and 
African countries, folder on Kuwait, “Declaration of further development of the relations between 
Tajikistan and Kuwait”, 1995, p.2-3  
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Arab Economic Development, 2004). Kuwait and Saudi Arabia expressed their 
solidarity during the Tajik humanitarian crisis in winter 2008. Kuwait disbursed $5 
million to Tajikistan for eliminating the damages experienced in the winter crisis28.  
 With the establishment of the Tajik Embassy to Kuwait in 2013, bilateral 
relations improved significantly. President Rahmon arrived for an official visit to 
Kuwait City and personally inaugurated the new diplomatic mission (Khovar, 2013). 
His visit also resulted in signing of additional seven interstate agreements that sustain 
positive bilateral relations. The overall purpose of boosting relations with Tajikistan 
was to provide support for its political infrastructure.  
 Implications for future research suggest that more studies on how economic 
volatility affects Tajik-GCC relations could draw insights from comparing and 
contrasting risks for shocks in Iran. To wit, the research literature has not emphasized 
how economic volatility in Iran influences Tajik-GCC relations. Though GCC 
countries produce FDI flows from remittances sent by expatriate workers in the UAE, 
similar flows from Kuwait to Tajikistan remain severely overlooked. Because of this 
oversight, the research implications suggest a need to determine how open door 
policy frameworks can help strike a balance in protecting against shocks resulting 
from market volatility in both Kuwait and Tajikistan. For the last two GCC countries 
of Bahrain and Oman, international relations with Tajikistan suggest a stronger 
tendency towards adopting bilateral trade agreements.  
 
                                                
28 Personal interview: Ardasher Qodiri, Doha, May 2015 
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Bahrain and Oman 
 The economic literature on Bahrain notes now that despite its membership in 
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it remain largely 
inactive on a global scale aside from oil production (Koren&Tenreyro, 2010). 
Interestingly, Bahrain has a largely overlooked reputation as the “earliest diversifier” 
by participating in “other activities” such as real estate, public administration, 
education, and health (Koren&Tenreyro, 2010, p. 6). For example, during the 1980s, 
other activities comprised approximately half of Bahrain's economy. Moreover, 
nearly ten percent of Bahrain's GDP derives from further diversification efforts 
during the 1980s that included the manufacturing sector (Koren&Tenreyro, 2010). 
Yet, in spite of economic diversification, Bahrain remains vulnerable to market 
volatility and shocks. However, compared to other GCC countries, market volatility 
in Bahrain maintains a surprising level of consistency.  
 Still, the information presented in the research literature has limited 
availability and the most recently published studies to date note the effect of market 
volatility in Bahrain only until 2005 (Koren&Tenreyro, 2010). Because of this large 
research gap, the effects on Tajik-GCC relations suggest a need to conduct extensive 
investigations into how market volatility in Bahrain influences foreign policy 
development. For Oman, on the other hand, having an openness to technological 
innovation in the same manner as Qatar indicates how education influences Tajik-
GCC relations concerning domestic and foreign policy (Wiseman, 2010).  
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 Though overlooked in the scholarly literature, Oman has importance for how 
open door policy frameworks enhance global trade networks through increased 
privatization of businesses in multiple sectors and industries (Toone, 2012). In many 
ways, the economic trajectory taken by Oman has remarkable similarities with the 
UAE in that the capital city of Muscat has a trade-dominated economy. However, as 
Bahrain often experiences lower rates of inflation in spite recent political instability 
resulting from the Arab Spring, Oman has an economic history of experiencing high 
inflation (Toone, 2012). With respect to foreign policy development, hardly any 
research information to date articulates how improved international relations between 
Tajikistan, Bahrain, and Oman encourage economic development by establishing 
bilateral and even multilateral trade agreements.  
 An extremely limited number of diplomatic meetings have taken place 
between Tajikistan and Bahrain as well as between Tajikistan and Oman. Despite this 
gap, Tajikistan intends to improve relations by encouraging investors in Bahrain and 
Oman to develop bilateral trade agreements29. Such agreements would bolster the 
hydroelectric, tourism, and mining industries of Tajikistan (“Huge Potential,” 2014). 
For Oman, cooperation remains a central feature of international relations with 
Tajikistan.  
 In 2010, when Tajikistan experienced earthquakes and flooding, Oman 
provided foreign aid in the sum of $3 million to support the reconstruction of houses, 
schools, and mosques. In addition to that, with the spillover of the Yemeni crisis and 
                                                
29	Personal interview: Azamsho Sharifi, Dushanbe, Feb. 2016 
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launch of the Saudi Operation Restoring Hopes, Tajik side asked Oman to assist with 
the evacuation of its citizens from Yemen through their territory to Dubai. This 
request was quickly handled by the Omani side and Tajik citizens safely returned 
home.30Aside from this information, the research information on diplomatic relations 
between Tajikistan, Bahrain, and Oman deserves more in-depth investigations of how 
providing foreign aid to a relatively developing country in Central Asia bolsters 
economic growth. Though many large gaps remain present in the research literature, 
the available information allows for a comparison of advantages and disadvantages of 
how diplomatic relations shape foreign policy developments between Tajikistan and 
GCC countries.  
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Contemporary Tajik-
GCC Relations 
 Tajik-GCC relations indicate positive growth. However, the strength of 
international relations in this geopolitical context reflects indicators of local and 
regional influence, political influence of leaders, mutual agreement between political 
leaders, and the potential for economic expansion. The research findings indicated 
that Tajik-GCC relations do not always reflect the political and economic realities of 
native Tajiks. Possible efforts for cooperation building between Tajikistan and GCC 
countries imply economic expansion of the hydropower, mining, and tourism 
                                                
30 Personal interview: Ardasher Qodiri, Doha, May 2015 
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industries31. Indeed, there are huge flows of investments coming from the regional 
hegemons such as China for instance. But for Tajikistan, the relations with the Gulf 
States are very crucial. It considers the Gulf State as a natural ally and feels more 
comfortable while cooperating with them based on the shared historical interaction, 
culture and religion. Especially in the light of the present events that are happening in 
the wider Muslim world, for Tajikistan now the top priority became the political 
stability in the country. In that context, having strong and friendly relations with the 
Gulf States are of an equal importance.32   
 The hydroelectric power industry of Tajikistan suggests a possibility for 
obtaining a dominant position in Central Asia. Exporting hydropower resources to 
Central Asia and even South Asia poses major complications because of migration 
policies favoring low- or semi-skilled male workers employed only on a temporary 
basis (Sasikumar, 2014). Because of its heavily mountainous terrain, Tajikistan risks 
losing $200 million annually for not having the resources to export its hydroelectric 
capacity. Despite this major drawback, US-backed foreign aid donated $15 million 
towards expanding the Tajik hydroelectric power industry (U.S. Department of State, 
2013). Considering its international relations with China, Russia, and India, the 
economic future of Tajik-GCC relations relies on a leveraging of soft power over 
consumers through a strategic combination of bandwagoning and balancing foreign 
policy efforts.  
                                                
31	Personal	interview:	Erkin	Kasymov,	Dushanbe,	Dec.	2015	
32 Personal	interview:	Ardasher	Qodiri,	Doha,	May	2015 
  71 
 The current state of Tajik-GCC relations remain critical for economic 
development in Central Asia. Tajikistan views GCC countries as geopolitical allies 
along historical, cultural, and religious lines. Because of the turmoil in Tajik-Afghan 
relations, the only possible method of importing and exporting goods into Tajikistan 
is to access routes along the Pakistani coast. Therefore, Tajikistan has highest interest 
in stability and peace in Afghanistan, which gives cause for establishing an important 
political projects33. Support from Russia will likely facilitate the strengthening of 
Tajik-Afghan relations, though future research is necessary for any findings to 













                                                
33	Personal	interview:	Erkin	Kasymov,	Dushanbe,	Dec.	2015	
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Chapter Four: Discussion of Results and Implications for 
Future Research 
 To wit, this study was the first to explore the history of foreign policy 
developments as grounded in international relations between Tajikistan and GCC 
countries. In the foreign policy arena, such historical explanations have a formative 
influence in providing rich material for constructing possible alternatives to nation-
building (Rosenau, 1969). The findings of this study indicated that Tajik-GCC 
relations stem from historical tradition dating back to the eighth century CE when the 
Samanid Empire was the first official Tajik state. Tajik-Arab relations began to 
deteriorate after the Turkic Invasion and deteriorated further after Tajikistan was no 
longer a protectorate of the Soviet Union. During its initial stages of independent 
statehood, Tajikistan was not able to accommodate itself to rapid shifts of the global 
economy. Complications in foreign policy developments resulted as the post-Soviet 
conflict from 1992 to 1997 coalesced with the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 
1996. After the post-Soviet conflict, Tajik foreign policy consisted of three goals 
related to national survival, securing foreign aid or nation-building efforts, and 
developing effective national security policies. A large military presence of Russia 
reflected how Tajik foreign policy was bandwagoning strategy against political 
isolation.  
 The 9/11 terrorist-attacks involved US-led efforts encouraging Tajikistan to 
re-strengthen its international ties with GCC countries based on common cultural and 
religious ties. In the Tajik capital city of Dushanbe, President Rahmon identified a 
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need to include foreign policy mechanisms for preventing future terrorist attacks. 
Russian and US-led military efforts effectively led to Tajikistan applying a more 
balanced approach to foreign policy development. Balanced foreign policy efforts 
aimed to secure a place for Tajikistan in the global economy such that the 
introduction of open door policy frameworks suggested a willingness to cooperate on 
an international level. Open door foreign policy frameworks indicated a potential 
strengthening of Tajik-GCC relations with a special focus on bilateral trade 
agreements.  
 From the interview data, Tajikistan is in the process of engaging in diplomatic 
actions to guarantee stable economic flows. Despite the risk for growing tensions 
between Tajikistan, Russia, and Iran, the preliminary hypothesis is that, from a Tajik 
perspective, foreign policy efforts in Tajikistan have historical and cultural patterns of 
political behavior as underscored by early post-Soviet era political ideology receives 
only partial support. While historical and cultural developments indeed determined 
current Tajik-GCC relations, securing national interests after the 1991 Soviet collapse 
remained a top priority.  
 Contemporary perspectives on Tajik-GCC relations indicate a strong need for 
cooperation in the hydro-energy, tourism, and mining industries. However, barriers to 
cooperation in Tajik-GCC relations slow down the process of implementing effective 
foreign policy regulations. From this, future studies may want to further their 
understanding of how open door theoretical frameworks affect foreign policy 
development between small and larger states. Typically, smaller states do not have an 
  74 
influential role in global economics, international relations between them and 
neighboring states provide insights for evaluating how foreign policy efforts may rely 
either on bandwagoning or balancing strategies.  
 
Limitations of the Research 
 The following limitations of this study are worth noting. Perhaps the 
insufficient and inadequate amount of scientific research on Tajikistan was the most 
significant limitation. Another significant limitation was the lack of interview data. 
While an intended goal of this study was to conduct interviews with a large enough 
population sample, most of the desired participants indicated a lack of availability of 
a strong lack of interest in disclosing the diplomatic missions of Tajik-GCC relations. 
Only nine participants provided interview data for this study. However, despite the 
limited number of participants, in-depth qualitative interviews have methodological 
implications for future studies.  
 A third limitation to this study was how it did not assess present-day Tajik-
GCC relations. The data lacked high quality for providing the researcher with an aim 
to explore possibilities for improving Tajik-GCC relations. A common limitation to 
conducting research in this area suggests a lack of reporting mechanisms for 
investigating the amount of foreign aid disbursed by GCC countries to Tajikistan. The 
available data indicate a general level of consistency in foreign aid disbursements 
over recent years, official reports were difficult to locate. As a result, the monetary 
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figures cited drew from observations of foreign aid disbursements by a ruling political 
party from notes in archived information drawing attention to the disbursements in 
critical periods. 
 
Implications for Future Research 
 Because this study had an exploratory nature, the implications for future 
research are plentiful. The substantial number of large research gaps concerning 
Tajik-GCC relations indicate a further need to fulfill not only intellectual curiosity but 
also to test hypotheses of prior studies (Stebbins, 2001). However, this study relied on 
qualitative data from an extremely limited number of participants and information 
obtained from interviews with government representatives and non-state actors of 
Tajikistan with ties to GCC countries. Qualitative data useful to obtain research 
findings from the scholarly literature included references to news content, 
government documents, personal correspondence, and peer-reviewed academic 
studies.  
 As noted in the Introduction of this thesis, most of the research literature 
addressing issues on Tajikistan refer to this Central Asian nation in rather oblique 
ways. Drawing from the historical overview of Tajikistan, recent patterns of 
economic development by way of open door policy frameworks work to strike an 
important balance between local and regional economies. Tajik-GCC relations serve 
to provide a working model for achieving success in a global economy. Foreign 
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policy efforts involve the construction of bilateral trade agreements, though some 
GCC countries like Kuwait presented complicating factors referring to its use of 
multilateral agreements.  
 Continued patterns of diplomatic relations between Iran, Russia, and 
Tajikistan may also provide insights in future studies on how a Muslim religious 
identity shapes resistance to Western notions of global economic trade. While Tajik-
Iranian relations depend on an affiliation of Persian identity and culture, Tajikistan 
maintains some influence from when it was a former member of the Soviet Union. 
Explorations in foreign policy directives between the three nations warrant future 
investigations on how to reconcile ideological differences founded in religious 
causes.  
 Despite how Tajikistan indicates significant potential to obtain a role as a key 
economic player for the Central Asian region, its geography prohibits the influx of 
essential goods. Future studies can then investigate the causes and effects of specific 
aspects related to foreign policy development within the context of providing regional 
security and political stability. Since Islam remains the dominant religion in both 
Tajikistan and GCC countries, open door policy frameworks must rely on a continued 
process of integration with Central Asia. 
 Issues of food security have critical importance especially for Tajikistan based 
on its heavily mountainous terrain. While GCC countries have relatively limited 
opportunities for fully engaging in strong agricultural policies, open door policy 
frameworks may involve Tajikistan placing restrictions on food imports in coming 
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years. The agricultural industry in Tajikistan and GCC countries does not give the 
impression of economic nor environmental sustainability. Preservation of water 
resources should hold top priority as the Middle East and Central Asia must now 
depend on global economic networks influenced by Western standards. With 
particular concern for Saudi Arabia, foreign policy directives may benefit from 
constructing trade agreements emphasizing the importance of food security and water 
supply.  
 Concerning relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), future studies 
may benefit from evaluating the macro- and micro-economic effects of labor 
migration on FDI flows between Tajikistan and other GCC countries. The effects of 
FDI flows have implications for the amount of funds sent as remittances sent by 
migrant laborers to their home country. For Qatar, future studies can investigate the 
effects of open door policy frameworks for controlling the production of nuclear 
technology. In light of recent negotiations between Iran and US over nuclear energy, 
future studies may provide clues for how this affects Tajik-GCC relations.  
 Also for Qatar, openness to technological innovation after economic 
liberalization warrants continued studies on how a media and entertainment industry 
has the potential to shape discussions about foreign policy directives. For the 
remaining GCC countries—Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman—future studies will benefit 
from investigating the effects of global economic expansion on foreign policy 
development. Results of this study indicated how an economic history of market 
volatilities presented significant risk for incurring shocks. Yet, a significant research 
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gap warrants in-depth studies about how market volatilities and risk for shock affect 
Tajik-GCC relations.  
 Perhaps the political and economic future of international relations between 
Tajikistan and GCC countries depends on a leveraging of consumer markets while 
striking an important balance in foreign policy developments. Relations between 
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Russia, Iran, and China all affect the economic future of 
Central Asia. Enhancements to foreign policy directives will likely involve shifts in 
how Tajikistan and GCC countries negotiate over which routes for economic trade 
will produce the greatest profits for all involved parties. Although support from 
Russia and Iran has the potential to strengthen Tajik-GCC relations, the implications 
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Appendix A 
Informed Consent Form 
 
 
Dear Participant,  
 
Thank you for taking part in this study.  
My name is Aziz Bobohojiev and I am a graduate student in the Gulf Studies 
Department of College of Arts and Sciences at the Qatar University.  The study that I 
am conducting is a part of the research that will be done for my thesis. In sum, my 
thesis is about the Tajik-GCC diplomatic and socio-economic relations. It aims to 
determine what has led to the development of relations between the Gulf States and 
Tajikistan, and do the historical and cultural relations help in anyways in enforcing 
this relation. Further the study will analyze the economic relations between two 
parties and will suggest priorities for the development of cooperation in a short and 
long run.  
For the sake of your time and availability, the interview will be conducted in a place 
and time that will suite you best. The interview will be made up of open-ended 
questions about the establishment and development of the relations of Tajikistan and 
GCC. Ideally, the interview will be 1 hour long, but however, it will not exceed 1,5 
hour. Your participation in this interview is completely voluntary, and all responses to 
the questions will be kept confidential. You may refuse to answer any of the 
questions, and you may withdraw your consent and discontinue participation in this 
study at any time.  
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As was mentioned before, your participation is completely voluntarily, it will not 
have any financial benefits, nor it will pose any penalty on you in case of your 
withdrawal. Your participation, however, will help to better understand Tajik-GCC 
relations as well as their foreign policies towards each other as it is the first attempt in 
academia to map these relations.  All the collected data will be strictly confidential 
and in no way will be shared with third parties. However, for the sake of quality 
assurance of the research, the interview might be shared with the thesis supervisor 
only. None of your identification information such as your name, title, employment 
institution… etc will be mentioned in the study, unless you wish to be cited. After the 
completion of this thesis project, only myself might use gathered information in the 
future while conducting further research on the relevant studies.  
Although the interview will be conducted only once, I would seek your permission to 
contact you via e-mail or phone call in case of needed clarification of your answers.  
Would you have any further questions or concerns about this study or the researcher 
himself, as well as your rights as a participant, please feel free to contact our 
University or the Supervisor: 
Gulf Studies Program, College of Arts and Sciences, Qatar University, PO Box: 
2713, email: gulfstudiesprogram@qu.edu.qa; tel: +974 4403 6523.   
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Abdullah Baabood, Director of Gulf Studies Center, College 
of Arts and Sciences, Qatar University. Email: baabood@qu.edu.qa; tel: +974 4403 
4983.  
I am willing to participate in this study and by signing this consent form I hereby 
grant permission to use the information I provide for the purpose of the research.  
 
Signature:                                                                                  Date 
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Appendix B 
Interview participants: 
1. Mr. Azamsho Sharifi – former Ambassador of the Republic of Tajikistan to 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Advisor on Foreign Relations to the President 
of Tajikistan; 
2. Mr. Ali Mubarak Al-Mohannadi – Ambassador of the State of Qatar to the 
Republic of Tajikistan; 
3. Mr. Ardasher Qodiri – former Head of Asian and African Department MoFA, 
Ambassador of the Republic of Tajikistan to the State of Qatar; 
4. Mr. Erkin Kasymov – former Deputy Minister of Tajik MoFA, Ambassador 
of Tajikistan to the UK;    
5. Mr. Mukhtar Aliev – One of the first Tajik entrepreneurs established business 
in the UAE, currently Representative of Tajik Chamber of Commerce to the 
State of Qatar; 
6. Mr. Zuhursho Rahmatullaev - CEO and co-founder of Alif Capital34 and 
Peshraft Charity Fund (Tajikistan), Trustee of Tajikinvest Charitable Trust 
(UK); 
7. Barotzoda Faizullo – Director of Center for Islamic Studies, Tajikistan;  
8. Loiqnazar Imomi – Senior Specialist, Department of Analysis and Prediction 
of Foreign Policy, Center for Strategic Studies, Tajikistan;  
                                                
34	Established	in	2014,	this	is	the	first	and	only	organization	in	Tajikistan	providing	
financial	services	based	on	the	principles	of	Islamic	banking.		
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Appendix C 
 
Source: Source: Annual reports from the UAE Ministry of International Cooperation and Development 
 
